Does This Make Sense?

A pair of simultaneous reports has me scratching my head. First, from Syracuse, New York, we learn:

[Radiation] detectors are now in the hands of two local police agencies, as well as state police, as the Office of Homeland Security expands its radiological security program into Central New York.

The hope is if a terrorist is transporting radioactive material to make a dirty bomb, police will be alerted to the material in transit, at the assembly point of the device or at the plot's launch site, said Frank Tabert, deputy director of the state Office of Homeland Security.

The detectors are paid for by grants from the Office of Homeland Security. Twelve police agencies statewide with bomb squads shared $1.4 million in grant money.

Generally speaking, Deputy Chief Michael Kerwin of the Syracuse police, said the devices usually are given to traffic units on the highways and used at large events downstate, such as Times Square on New Year's Eve.

While radiation detectors have some utility in a protective system, their biggest limitation is that they are, for the most part, a last-minute intervention. For this type of intervention to work, you've got to have a bad guy who is already in the U.S., has procured radioactive material and is transporting it so that he can assemble it (i.e., the 11th hour) or deploy it (i.e., the 11th hour, 59th minute).

Granted, the article does say New York intends to station larger, more sophisticated detectors at toll booths and other locations - and this makes some sense, as it's a good idea to station such equipment at transportation bottlenecks. But detectors alone are far from sufficient to protect against radiological threats.

At the same time, in the UK there is doubt about whether European ports - another key bottleneck in the transportation system - will continue radiation scanning of US-bound cargo. The problem? Not enough money:

Doubt has been cast over whether the security scanning of containers bound for the US from Southampton docks will continue after questions were raised over the financial feasibility of the move long term.

The city's docks were among the first ports in the world to start scanning containers destined for the US for nuclear materials as part of a move to step up homeland counter terrorism measures.

[I]t has been reported that the European Union has expressed concern over the long term feasibility of the programme after it was calculated that imposing the scanning of all containers would cost in the region of $500 a unit to US trading partners, based on simple calculations.

Overseas radiation scanning of cargo containers makes a world of sense. It is part of a layered security strategy, aimed at preventing the theoretical bad guy from moving radiological materials into the U.S. in the first place.

Not only that, but ports themselves are key potential targets for a radiological attack. If a "dirty bomb" were deployed in a port and the area became contaminated with radiation, port operations might be shut down for an extended period, with significant economic effects (especially locally).

The idea that we are deploying a new, 11th-hour intervention but potentially losing another layer of the security system is a puzzler.

Port Security: How Much Is Enough?

The Port of Los Angeles is testing a new "small craft intrusion barrier" designed to prevent small boats from approaching cruise and cargo ships while they are docked:

While the foam and steel cable obstacle might not look like much, port authorities say they hope it will serve as a deterrent to small boats that may pose a threat to cruise ships and cargo vessels passing through the port.

"The barrier stops the vessel, then forces it to bounce back," said George Cummings, director of homeland security for the Port of Los Angeles.

Port officials said they hope the new security device will prevent a terrorist attack similar to the one in Yemen that killed 17 American sailors and wounded 39 others when a small boat laden with explosives blew a large hole in the USS Cole on Oct. 12, 2000.

The idea of protecting docked ships has merit, of course. But what protective interventions are planned for ships that are underway? From an attacker's perspective, a ship in the channel may be a more tempting target than a docked ship anyway. If you can seriously wound or sink a ship, you might be able to block the channel and interfere with the port's operations for some time.

So while the small craft intrusion barrier is a legitimate protective intervention, does it really address the port's biggest risk? It wouldn't seem so.

They also conducted a host of other security interventions:

About 50 port police officers used the occasion to conduct a drill and test several other tools aimed at bolstering security.

The port's canine unit sniffed for explosives around the cruise terminal. Five dive team officers clad in black wetsuits plunged into the harbor's cold water to look for suspicious devices. A hazardous materials team used bio-sensors to search for contaminants.

Elsewhere, port police officers tested the new Long Range Acoustical Device, a loud alarm meant to deter wayward recreational boaters from entering restricted areas.

While a port needs a whole system of preventive interventions, the thing about all these is that they're "11th hour" interventions. They are effective only after a potential malicious actor has gone operational - i.e., planted the explosives or contaminants, taken the helm of a small boat to launch an attack. At this point an attack would be imminent, so you'd need excellent intelligence to detect the hazards or intercept a small boat. And of course an alarm wouldn't do - the terrorist would simply ignore it.

So while these may be elements of the port's security regime, there needs to be more than this.

I still like this as a proactive preventive intervention for port security, humble as it is.

All Prevention is Local ... and Small

So much of the time, prevention is mundane, ordinary stuff on the local - and even personal - level. Secure your belongings. Be aware of your surroundings. Pay attention to people acting strangely.

But when people collaborate on these sorts of efforts, the benefits multiply:

[O]ver the past few years, the Wilmington Boat Owners Association (WBOA) has successfully launched a formalized Marina Watch program at seven of the 14 marinas at the Port of Los Angeles.

Each month, a Port Police community officer attends the association’s monthly meeting, where boaters can discuss issues or concerns at local marinas.

“It takes local knowledge to police a port,” explained Sgt. Kevin McCloskey of the Los Angeles Port Police. “There are a lot of intricacies and unique things about a port region — particularly one with blended uses.”

If one marina reports a theft or suspicious persons or activities in or around the marina, officers will walk the docks at night to help resolve the situation, explained Donna Ethington, president of the WBOA.

“The boating community has a much better relationship with the Port Police than in the past,” she explained. “They’re out in our community, they understand the issues and they can go straight to the decision makers and resolve them. It’s a great partnership.”

While drug deals, auto thefts, boat break-ins, stolen dinghies and outboard engines, and dock box theft were once regular occurrences in Port of Los Angeles-area marinas, there is now a near zero incident rate, Ethington said.

Note how the flow of information is two-way. Police share information with marina tenants and vice versa:

To alert marina tenants to unusual occurrences, Port Police community relations officers send e-mails to WBOA members and other local boat owners. “Being (that each marina is) a tight-knit community, it is important for our officers to know the people in various locations in the port, and have this free flow of communication,” explained Capt. Ralph Tracy of the Port Police. “If anything appears to be usual or out of place, they don’t hesitate to pick up the phone and give us a call.”

And once the lines of communications are established, it's relatively easy to add dimensions to the relationship. For example, some marinas are adopting an all-hazards approach to preparedness:

At Ventura West Marina, dock captains have been established, training sessions have been held and many boaters are signed up for May CERT training. Each dock captain serves as a point of contact, distributes emergency preparedness information and assesses capabilities among tenants.

“We are realizing that in cases of a large emergency, such as a tsunami or fire, most of our emergency response teams are probably not going to respond to us right away -- so, we have to be capable of surviving on our own for a while,” said Chuck Ormson of Ventura West Marina.

It may seem quaint or old-fashioned to suggest that small, local efforts such as this can make a real difference to homeland security. After all, marina tenants are much more likely to spot vandals than terrorists.

But if you were a criminal or aspiring terrorist, which would present a more challenging target: a port with an active network of concerned marina tenants is going to be a harder target than a port without such a network? Where would you try to pull something?

That's the key distinction. An observant local citizenry with trusting connections to law enforcement is a great prevention tool. In fact, one danger for such a program might be that it can work too well:

Nicole Avalos, a Neighborhood Watch coordinator for the Port of Long Beach, is currently trying to re-establish a Marina Watch program that was discontinued five years ago. “It just came to an end,” she said.

Once the incidents that many residents had complained about were resolved, locals became less involved in the program, she said. “We want to change that and be more proactive, and keep people involved long-term,” she said.

Forward-Thinking Port Security

A nice story out of Wrightsville Beach, NC, in the wake of a recent incident where authorities received a tip that a nuclear device was present at the Port of Wilmington. They determined it was a hoax. But the important thing is how they were prepared for it:

“One of the things we had to do was start developing relationships with our counterparts in emergency services — law enforcement, fire, EMS, Coast Guard — all those folks who have a stake in the port facility,” Doug Campen, director of safety and security for the North Carolina State Ports Authority, said.

The Port of Wilmington utilizes four levels of security — Port Authority Security, the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (USBP) and local agencies. Each agency plays a different role in keeping the ports secure. For example, the USBP is responsible for container inspection, Campen said. Each agency is vital to the port’s security, but the cooperation of local agencies — WPD, the New Hanover County Sheriff’s Department, the Leland Police Department and the Brunswick County Sheriff’s Department — come to the fore in an emergency situation.

“In the event we have something major where we needed additional manpower, those are the folks we’re going to be calling upon. Our first responders would be local (agencies),” Campen said.

Ideally, local agencies would be involved in prevention as much as response. Everyone has a piece of the puzzle.

On Critical Infrastrucure: Think Downstream

A brief note on the new GAO report on maritime security, focusing on the potential for disasters affecting the maritime energy infrastructure - particularly terrorist attacks against oil and liquified natural gas (LNG) tankers.

Much of the effort is focused, appropriately, on prevention. Much of this work is the responsibility of agencies such as DHS, the Coast Guard, and port authorities.

But an attack on the energy infrastructure - especially the oil infrastructure - could have downstream economic effects that local authorities can and should be prepared for. GAO alludes to a general lack of preparedness regarding these effects:

Multiple attack response plans are in place to address an attack, but stakeholders face three main challenges in making them work.

First, plans for responding to a spill and to a terrorist threat are generally separate from each other, and ports have rarely exercised these plans simultaneously to see if they work effectively together.

Second, ports generally lack plans for dealing with economic issues, such as prioritizing the movement of vessels after a port reopens. The President’s maritime security strategy calls for such plans.

Third, some ports report difficulty in securing response resources to carry out planned actions. Federal port security grants have generally been directed at preventing attacks, not responding to them, but a more comprehensive risk-based approach is being developed.

The short-term consequences of an attack - say, a small boat attack against a supertanker at a U.S. port - would be confusing enough, with many, many potential players involved:

[A]t the national level, the National Response Plan lays out the broad parameters of the federal role, both in spill response (that is, taking steps to contain a spill and mitigate its environmental damage, regardless of how it occurred) and in terrorism response (that is, for the attack, taking security-related actions and conducting an investigation).

The plan designates the Coast Guard as the primary agency for spill response on water and the FBI as the primary agency for terrorism response, and it calls on the two agencies to coordinate their responses if the incident involves an attack on energy commodity tankers.

Other federal plans and agreements also come into play, each with information about coordinating responses among the various agencies involved or taking specific action. At the port level, under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Coast Guard’s Captain of the Port is to establish separate plans for spill and terrorism responses, working with local agencies, which are subsequently approved by Coast Guard districts. For both types of response plans, the agencies may include port authorities, fire departments, and facilities in the port. Some stakeholders, such as private oil spill response organizations, participate only in spill response planning, while other stakeholders, such as police departments, participate mainly in terrorism response planning.

But then the longer-term economic consequences are worth considering. Local authorities should be prepared for a potential economic slow-down:

Finally, the economic consequences of a major attack could include a temporary price spike reflecting fears of further attacks, and supply disruptions associated with delays of shipments if major transit routes, key facilities, or key ports are closed.

The loss of one cargo of an energy commodity might not have a significant, sustained price impact. However, if an attack results in port closures for multiple days or weeks, price responses and higher costs could mean losses in economic welfare to consumers, businesses, and government amounting to billions of dollars.

It's not just oil that we have to think about. If a port is closed or damaged, other commodities may not be able to enter, either.

The good news is that the U.S. has many ports, and for most commodities, other ports could pick up the slack. (Though this is not true for some shipments, as not all ports can handle the largest vessels, and not all ports can handle all types of commodities.) Especially in areas whose economic health is dependent on the inflow of goods to a given port or ports, these sorts of downstream effects should be considered part of the preparedness plan.

Port Prevention - The Small Boat Threat

Government Computer News reports on new technology that helps improve situational awareness in U.S. ports.

New visualization tools are helping the Coast Guard develop situational awareness at the Port of Miami, but more assistance is needed to track small boats and noncooperative vessels...

The Homeland Security Department’s Directorate of Science and Technology is funding the Visualization Tools for Situational Awareness and Emergency Response program, also known as Viz Tools.

Despite this, the threat is still the same as it was in the USS Cole bombing more than seven years ago: small boats:

Although the program is resulting in improved maritime domain awareness, there are still gaps. For example, the Coast Guard needs better information on the 170,000 registered small craft in Miami, Dade and Broward counties, Schultz said.

"The small boat threat ... continues to present technology and policy challenges and remains a primary maritime security concern," said [Commander Karl Schultz, who heads the Coast Guard’s Miami sector].

What to do? One suggestion: Better coordination between port authorities and local law enforcement:

Stephen Dryden, chief executive officer of the Mariner Group LLC ... recommended additional aids to further improve situational awareness, including the integration of cargo and vessel information into Viz Tools, more coordination with local law enforcement agencies and improved long-range tracking of vessels.

With 170,000 registered small boats in the water, there is a need for information-sharing. You have to be able to recognize potential threats before they manifest themselves. As in the case with the Cole, if you wait until the boat is in the water and moving toward its target, it's too late for prevention.

Port Security Shortfall

Just taking note:

The Coast Guard faces budget challenges in obtaining the $260 million it estimates is needed to upgrade its command centers to meet the requirements of the Safe Port Act of 2006, according to a new report from the Government Accountability Office.

[A]ccording to the Coast Guard, none of the existing 35 sector command centers currently meets the requirements of the act, the report states.

However, four joint operations centers the Coast Guard has established with the Navy are a significant step in meeting these requirements, the report states.

There's nothing new about funding shortfalls, of course. Ports are such critical links in our economic system and critical nodes in our domestic security system, that I continue to be amazed by any shortfalls in securing them.

Radiation Detection Update

An update on earlier posts regarding radiation detection:

HLS Watch points out that the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) is starting a project to evaluate radiation detection systems at ports - specifically, at the transfer point from ship to rail:

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will soon begin conducting multiple projects in the Port of Tacoma, Wash., to evaluate technology and concepts of operations for radiation detection that will scan cargo at various points in transfer from ship to rail. By establishing a Rail Test Center (RTC) at the port, DHS will identify and evaluate radiological and nuclear detection solutions for intermodal rail port facilities that can be used across the country.

As I've argued before, a detection system is necessary but not sufficient to address the threat. A system of detectors, no matter how robust, is essentially a series of nets intended to snare an adversary.

Nets can be avoided, however. A comprehensive preventive scheme should exploit all aspects of the threat: the adversary, his motivations, his capabilities, his financial and human resources, his access to weapons, and his access to the target.

Cross-posted in IPS Blogs at the Institute for Preventive Strategies.

Radiation Detectors: Here, There, and Everywhere

The Secure Freight Initiative is getting its first operational tests, says Government Technology:

The departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and Energy (DOE) announced that operational testing is underway in Honduras and Pakistan to strengthen global supply chain security by scanning shipping containers for nuclear or radiological materials before they are allowed to depart for the United States. The tests represent the initial phase of the Secure Freight Initiative announced Dec. 7, 2006, which involves the deployment of nuclear detection devices to six foreign ports.

Secure Freight Initiative testing in Puerto Cortes, Honduras, started on April 2, 2007. Tests in Port Qasim, Pakistan, the first port to participate in Secure Freight Initiative, began in March of this year. Four other Secure Freight Initiative ports are expected to initiate tests this year. They are: Southampton in the United Kingdom; Salalah in Oman; Port of Singapore; and the Gamman Terminal at Port Busan in Korea.

Data gathered from overseas scanning of U.S. bound containers will be transmitted in near real-time to U.S. Customs and Border Protection Officers working in overseas ports and to the National Targeting Center. The data will be combined with other risk assessment information to improve analysis, targeting and scrutiny of high-risk containers.

But this doesn't mean that our problems are solved. Overseas dectectors are just one of a number of concentric rings of protection. (And even accurate detection won't help unless appropriate actions are taken in response to the recognition of a threat.)

It's worth noting that a recent GAO report said that the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) needs to compile better testing data on radiation detection systems - and, more immediately relevant to state and local homeland security personnel - DNDO needs to communicate better with state and local authorities, because they're responsible for some of those rings of protection.

The new GAO report extends their report of last October, in which they criticized DNDO's testing of Advanced Spectroscopic Portals (ASPs). (My summary of October's report is here.)

Current portal monitors, made of polyvinyl toluene (plastic) and known as “PVTs,” detect the presence of radiation but cannot distinguish between benign, naturally occurring radiological materials (NORM) such as ceramic tile, and dangerous materials such as highly enriched uranium (HEU). DNDO hopes that the next generation of portal monitors, known as “Advanced Spectroscopic Portals” (ASP), will be able to detect and more specifically identify radiological and nuclear materials within a shipping container. DNDO has stated that it will begin conducting tests of ASPs in February 2007 and begin fielding ASPs in spring 2007.

As of October 2006, which is the most recent date for which complete data are available, DNDO and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) had installed 912 portal monitors at the nation’s points of entry. All of the portal monitors are PVTs. According to senior DNDO officials, DHS plans to deploy at ports of entry this year 60 of the 80 ASPs that it has purchased with fiscal year 2006 funds. DNDO plans to use the remaining 20 ASPs for further testing or refurbishment after it has completed its tests on ASPs this year. Ultimately, DHS plans to deploy about 3,000 portal monitors at the nation’s points of entry by September 2009. However, as we reported in March 2006, CBP’s deployment of portal monitors is behind schedule, and it appears unlikely that CBP will be able to reach its deployment goal on schedule.

That sounds okay, even if it's a bit behind schedule. But ... will the detectors work? That's a little less certain. Testing is incomplete:

DNDO has not yet collected a comprehensive inventory of testing information on commercially available PVT portal monitors. Such information—if collected and used—could improve DNDO’s understanding of how well portal monitors detect different radiological and nuclear materials under varying conditions.

According to radiation detection experts, portal monitor tests are important because they help determine how well the monitors work in real-life situations and provide information for making the monitors better. In addition, DNDO and radiation detection experts agree that portal monitors should be tested both in a laboratory-controlled setting, to learn about their performance capabilities, and under an assortment of real-life conditions, such as at seaports, to learn how well they perform under various environmental conditions in the field.

So there is some uncertainty there. Complicating matters further, state and local agencies are expected to purchase and install radiation detectors, based on their own knowledge (limited) and DNDO's advice (based on an incomplete survey of test results):

Furthermore, according to DNDO’s Expenditure Plan, DNDO expects to rely heavily on the participation of state and local agencies to help protect the interior of the nation from a radiological or nuclear attack. In this regard, DNDO plans to support these agencies’ efforts to develop radiation detection and interdiction capabilities. For example, DNDO plans include working with state and local agencies to, among other things, deploy fixed and mobile radiation detection systems to help defend major, high-risk cities. As part of DNDO’s Securing the Cities Initiative, it plans to identify a limited number of high-risk regions, then provide these regions with federally owned radiation detection equipment along with related training and other support packages. DNDO expects that state and local agencies will eventually purchase their own equipment and assume increasingly greater responsibilities in radiation detection efforts within their borders.

To their credit, DNDO has made efforts to communicate with state and local authorities - but they have made a basic error of information-sharing: they have not asked state and local authorities what kind of information they need. (Information -sharing 101: it has to be a two-way street).

To further assist states and localities in their radiation detection efforts, DNDO has begun training state and local officials on how to operate radiation detection equipment. For example, state officials may attend 2-day training courses for law enforcement officials at DHS’s Counter Terrorism Operation Support facility at NTS. Moreover, DNDO has worked to get DHS to provide grants to state and local governments to, among other things, fund their radiation detection efforts. For instance, in September 2006 DHS issued grants totaling $3.2 million to states such as Kentucky and South Carolina to invest in fixed, mobile, and handheld radiation detection equipment at interstate truck weigh stations. While DHS provides some information to states and localities on radiation detection equipment, officials from some states told us that DHS has not sought much input from them on what types of information they find most useful or valuable.

[O]fficials from 8 states and the District of Columbia told us they would benefit from having more direct guidance to assist them in making purchasing decisions. According to officials from these 9 entities, they could use DNDO's input to help overcome their lack of experience and technical expertise.

To give DNDO their due, they really are trying:

DNDO is improving its efforts to provide technical and operational information about radiation portal monitors to state and local authorities. For example, DNDO recently helped to establish a Web site (the Responder Knowledge Base) that, among other things, includes information for state and local officials on radiation detection equipment products and performance requirements. However, some state representatives with whom we spoke, particularly those from states with less experience conducting radiation detection programs, would like to see DNDO provide more prescriptive advice on what types of radiation detection equipment to deploy and how to use it.

And they're somewhat limited in the advice they can give:

DNDO maintains that federal regulation prohibits it from recommending to state and local officials portal monitors that are made and sold by specific manufacturers.

And they recognize the problem:

DHS also concurred with our recommendation that it confer with state and local officials regarding their information needs, pointing out a number of ongoing efforts to disseminate information. These include: meeting with its stakeholder group comprised of representatives from 22 states, offering help at establishing standards, providing test reports, developing response protocols, providing detection training, and facilitating access to federal experts for alarm adjudication, analysis, and nuclear detection-related information and intelligence.

But still, a problem's a problem.

To sum up: DHS' plan is to install radiation detectors overseas, in U.S. ports, and in U.S. cities. It's all protective intervention, with the goal of finding radioactive needles in the haystack of cargo. They are going to rely on state and local officials to do some of this detection, with some limited guidance from DNDO.

But the testing data on the radiation detectors is somewhat questionable, and the deployment schedule is falling behind. Hmm...

State and local authorities might want to consider other steps, such as identifying local sources of radioactivity and collaborating with their caretakers regarding their security (e.g., hospitals, food irradiators, oil and gas drilling operations, etc.) Another idea is what New York did - conduct a baseline radiological survey of the area, so that it easier to spot anomalous radiation.

The best security system will not solely rely on detection. The "detection" set of concentric rings should only be one in a system of concentric rings.

Foiled Maritime Terrorism in Morocco

Reuters is reporting today that a group of 12 would-be bombers have been foiled in Morocco. Their targets were foreign ships - an indication that jihadists continue to view economic targets as desirable, including maritime targets.

At least 12 would-be suicide bombers planned to blow up foreign ships at the Casablanca port and other Moroccan landmarks, top security officials were quoted as saying on Thursday.

They said at least six of the suspected bombers were still on the run, but others were arrested after their presumed leader blew himself up on March 11 to stop police taking him alive.

Abdelfattah Raydi, the 23-year suspected leader of the group of bombers, walked into an Internet cafe in Casablanca's Sidi Moumen slum on March 11 with another suspected bomber.

Raydi, who had worn an explosives belt for four days to avoid police catching him alive, detonated the device when the cafe owner shut the door and called authorities after he saw him consulting a jihadist Web site, newspapers said.

"Investigations showed that 12 suicide bombers among 30 terrorists linked to March 11's Casablanca plot were prepared to attack economic and security targets including blowing up foreign ships at Casablanca port and tourism facilities in Marrakesh, Essaouira and Agadir," wrote al Ahdath al Maghribia daily.

It's being called a "lucky accident" that the plot was prevented, but I'd say it's a good example of civic engagement in anti-terrorism. The Internet cafe owner could just have easily looked the other way, but he recognized a potential threat and decided to intervene.

The bad news out of the incident is that it provides further evidence of jihadists' attraction to the idea of mixing chemicals or biological agents with their bombs, as demonstrated on a number of recent occasions in Iraq.

The [Moroccan] papers also quoted officials as saying the would-be bombers planned to use "poison" in their planned attacks, showing a change in the country's home-grown terror.

Al Ahdath said the "poison" was a byproduct of tetanus pathogenic bacteria ...

These guys do a good job of sharing information via the Internet. If a tactic seems to work in one place, it begins to pop up in other places. So information sharing has to go on here, too, regarding vulnerability and risk.

GAO Report on LNG Risk

The GAO has released a new report on the risk of liquified natural gas (LNG). It's created by supercooling natural gas to -260 degrees Fahrenheit. This turns it into a liquid and reduces its volume 600 times.

In its liquid state, LNG is not flammable or explosive, so it can be transported in tankers. Since 1959, there have been more than 40,000 shipments, without a major incident. There are concerns about it, though, fueled by two factors:

1. Natural gas demand in the U.S. is expected to grow
2. After Sept. 11 (or perhaps more appropriately, since the attacks on the USS Cole and the French supertanker Limburg), there is concern about how much damage terrorists could do by attacking an LNG tanker or terminal.

The GAO examined a number of prior studies and consulted experts about the potential risks. They focused on three potential risks:

1. Leaking LNG forms a pool on the water. As the pool evaporates, it forms a cloud, which drifts onshore as an asphyxiation hazard.
2. The vapors from the LNG pool catch fire. This would burn hotter than oil.
3. The fire spreads to the LNG tanker, risking explosion.

Fortunately, none of these things has ever actually happened, so there are no real-world incidents to study.

Regarding the asphyxiation hazard, GAO found:

Only the Sandia National Laboratories’ study examined asphyxiation, and it concluded that asphyxiation did not pose a hazard to the general public.

Experts agreed that some hazards, such as freeze burns and asphyxiation, do not pose a hazard to the public.

Regarding the burn hazard, GAO found:

[T]he studies’ conclusions about the distance at which 30 seconds of exposure to the heat could burn people ranged from about 500 meters (less than 1/3 of a mile) to more than 2,000 meters (about 1-1/4 miles). The Sandia National Laboratories’ study concluded that the most likely distance for a burn is about 1,600 meters (1 mile).

Experts agreed that the most likely public safety impact of an LNG spill is the heat impact of a fire.

Regarding the explosion hazard, GAO found:

All three studies considered LNG vapor explosions unlikely unless the LNG vapors were in a confined space.

Experts agreed that explosions are not likely to occur in the wake of an LNG spill.

The Council on Foreign Relations also reported on the risk in February 2006, which provides good background and links to more resources on the subject.

CRS Report on Maritime Security

In January, the Congressional Research Service released a report on the threat of maritime terrorism.

While noting that "fewer than 1% of all global terrorist attacks since 1997 have involved maritime targets," the report discusses a few of the particular threats. It's an exercise in threat recognition.

The CRS notes that there are particular challenges to launching a maritime attack:

One U.S. naval analyst has identified a number of specific challenges for terrorists in the maritime environment:

• Maritime targets are relatively more scarce than land targets;
• Surveillance at sea offers less cover and concealment than surveillance on land;
• Tides, currents, wind, sea state, visibility, and proximity to land must all be factored into a maritime terror operation;
• Maritime terror operations may require skills that are not quickly or easily acquired such as special training in navigation, coastal piloting, and ship handling;
• Testing weapons and practicing attack techniques, hallmarks of Al Qaeda’s typically meticulous preparation, are harder and more difficult to conceal at sea than on land;
• The generally singular nature of maritime targets, the low probability of damage and casualties secondary to the intended target, and the problems associated with filming attacks at sea for terrorist publicity may also reduce the desirability of maritime targets.

Despite these difficulties, al Qaeda and other terrorists have chosen maritime targets in the past, including the USS Cole bombing in 2000, the attack on the French oil tanker Limburg in 2002, and the 2004 attack on the Philippine Superferry 14.

A maritime attack does not need to cause many human casualties to have an effect:

If economic loss is the primary objective, terrorists may seek to carry out different types of attacks, with potentially few human casualties but significant impacts to critical infrastructure or commerce. The Limburg bombing may have been an attack of this type, threatening to disrupt the global oil trade and causing considerable consternation among tanker operators. Although the bombing killed only one member of the Limburg’s crew, it caused insurance rates among Yemeni shippers to rise 300% and reduced Yemeni port shipping volumes by 50% in the month after the attack.

The report comments on the relative risks of different types of maritime attacks, starting with the nuclear "bomb in a box" (i.e., shipping container) scenario:

Expert estimates of the probability of terrorists obtaining a nuclear device have ranged from 50% to less than 1%. Among other challenges to obtaining such a device, experts believe it unlikely that countries with nuclear weapons or materials would knowingly supply them to a terrorist group. It also may be technically difficult to successfully detonate such a nuclear device. North Korea experienced technical failures in conducting its 2006 nuclear weapons test, and this test took place under highly controlled conditions. Attempting to detonate a nuclear device in a maritime terror attack could pose even greater operational challenges.

The risk of a "dirty bomb" attack may be higher, especially if the primary objective is economic damage, though there are skeptics:

Terrorist attacks on U.S. ports with radiological dispersion devices (“dirty” bombs) is also considered among the gravest maritime terrorism scenarios. A 2003 simulation of a series of such attacks concluded that they “could cripple global trade and have a devastating impact on the nation’s economy.” Many terrorism analysts view such a dirty bomb attack as relatively likely.

Scientists have long questioned whether terrorists could actually build a dirty bomb with catastrophic potential since handling the necessary radioactive materials could cause severe burns and would likely expose the builders to lethal doses of radiation. Building and transporting such a bomb safely and to avoid detection would likely require so much shielding that it would be “nearly impossible” to move. Weaker dirty bombs made from less radioactive (and more common) materials would be easier to build and deploy, but would have a much smaller physical impact and would likely cause few human casualties.

Attacking a tanker or port facility that handles liquified natural gas (LNG) could create a major explosion, though it's not easy:

To date, no LNG tanker or land-based LNG facility in the world has been attacked by terrorists. However, similar natural gas and oil assets have been favored terror targets internationally. The attack on the Limburg, although an oil tanker, is often cited as an indication of LNG tanker vulnerability.

Former Director of Central Intelligence, James Woolsey, has stated his belief that a terrorist attack on an LNG tanker in U.S. waters would be unlikely because its potential impacts would not be great enough compared to other potential targets. LNG terminal operators which have conducted proprietary assessments of potential terrorist attacks against LNG tankers, have expressed similar views.

If terrorists are looking for human casualties, a ferry is a possible target:

A RAND study in 2006 argued that attacks on passenger ferries in the United States might be highly attractive to terrorists because such attacks are easy to execute, may kill many people, would likely draw significant media attention and could demonstrate a terrorist group’s salience and vibrancy. One U.S. Coast Guard risk analyst reportedly has stated that “in terms of the probability of something happening, the likelihood of it succeeding and the consequences of it occurring, ferries come out at the very high end.” Such attacks have occurred overseas. As noted earlier in this report, terrorists linked to Al Qaeda attacked and sank the Philippine vessel Superferry 14 in 2004.

After examining the details, the report comes to this rather bland conclusion:

It appears, therefore, that while maritime terrorist attacks against the United States may be more difficult to execute and, consequently, less likely to occur than other types of attacks, they remain a significant possibility and warrant continued policy attention.

Dems Likely to Increase Domestic HLS Spending

With Democrats in the majority in the House, and maybe in the Senate, they will push for their proposals on Homeland Security. This generally means an increase in domestic expenditures, which would affect homeland security professionals at local, state, and federal levels. Government Computer News reports:

With the Democrats taking control of the House of Representatives next January for the first time since 9/11, the nation is likely to see changes in anti-terrorism policy and increased domestic spending.

Specifically, they are likely to push for full implementation of the 9/11 Commission's proposals, both international and domestic.

Other anti-terrorism areas of emphasis for Democrats in Congress have included urban and mass transit security; chemical security, port security, first responders, disaster preparedness and privacy.

It is certain that the Democrats will be eager to push for an approach that differentiates them from the Bush Administration. But as always, it won't be the amount of money they spend. It will be how smart they spend the money.

$1.2 Billion - But Will It Work?

Yesterday, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report that was critical of DHS' Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), who recently awarded a $1.2 billion dollar contract to a number of contractors for new portal monitors, known as “advanced spectroscopic portal monitors” (ASP), that can detect both the presence and the type of nuclear or radiological material.

DNDO tested ASPs in 2005. They set a goal of identifying highly enriched uranium (HEU) – the main ingredient in a "gun" type nuclear weapon – 95 percent of the time. But the ASP prototypes identified bare HEU only 70 to 88 percent of time. And when the HEU was masked with benign radiological materials, the success rates fell to 53 percent, 45 percent, and 17 percent for the three ASP systems tested.

GAO said:

Despite these results, DNDO did not use the information from these tests in its cost-benefit analysis. Instead, DNDO officials told us that since new portal monitors cannot meet the 95 percent level of performance, they relied on the assumption that they will reach that level of performance sometime in the future.

Moreover, DNDO’s cost-benefit analysis only considered the benefits of ASPs’ ability to detect and identify HEU and did not consider ASPs ability to detect and identify other nuclear and radiological materials.

In other words, DNDO did not consider the ASP portals' effectiveness in identifying radiological materials that would be useful in a dirty bomb, such as Cesium 137 and Cobalt 60.

GAO concludes:

DNDO’s cost-benefit analysis does not justify its recent decision to spend $1.2 billion to purchase and deploy ASP technology.

The lesson of this, as I see it, is that you have to take into account the entire spectrum of risk and reward before deciding on any particular intervention.

Maritime Terror Risks

The RAND Corporation released a new report yesterday, Maritime Terrorism: Risk and Liability. The authors used a threat-vulnerability-consequence methodology and concluded that the greatest risks in terms of threat and vulnerability are:

• Ferries: Onboard bombings
• Cruise Ships: Onboard bombings (followed closely by standoff artillery assauts and food or water contamination)
• Cargo Ships: Radiological Dispersal Device (i.e., dirty bomb)

Port Shutdown in Seattle

Interesting...

A terminal at the Port of Seattle was evacuated on Wednesday and a bomb squad was investigating a ship container that alarmed bomb-sniffing dogs, a port spokesman said.

...there is no radiation from the cargo container.

The container first raised suspicion when a screening using gamma ray technology about the contents' density did not match the items listed on the ships' manifest.

Coast Guard Petty Officer Tara Molle said the ship's inventory list indicated the container held oily rags.

Bomb-sniffing dogs detected the possible presence of explosives.

The Coast Guard did not know where the ship originated.

Update 08-17: False alarm. No explosives or radioactive material were found.