A Sensible Decision

An update on this story:

Prosecutors have dropped the "weapons of mass destruction" charge in the case of the South Carolina teenager who allegedly planned to bomb his school.

The teenager who allegedly planned to destroy his high school with explosives will not face a WMD charge at his anticipated trial, the Associated Press reported yesterday.

Ryan Schallenberger, 18, had been charged with attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction in connection with his suspected plot against Chesterfield High School. Federal prosecutors dropped the charge without explanation in May.

The WMD charge never made sense. He had enough ammonium nitrate to take out a classroom or two, but that's a far cry from a weapon of mass destruction.

Calling something "WMD" when it's not only confuses and dilutes the meaning of the term.

WMD?

When you start applying a term to cases where it ought not apply, you dilute its meaning:

An 18-year-old straight-A student accused of planning to bomb his high school was charged Tuesday with attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction, which carries a possible life sentence.

Authorities say his parents called police because he had ordered 10 pounds of ammonium nitrate, which they retrieved after getting a delivery notice from the postal service. Ammonium nitrate is a fertilizer that was a component in the deadly 1995 Oklahoma City bombing.

The kid seems extremely disturbed, and if he had gone ahead with an attack, the results could have been terrible.

But none of that means this would have been a WMD attack.

This sort of thing is irritating because if we start applying "WMD" to any threat that can kill a few dozen people, then the term has lost its potency - and we risk underestimating real WMD threats.

There are already enough problems with threat recognition - let's not muddy the waters by pretending that words can mean whatever we want them to mean.

Update 2008-05-09: A bit of perspective on what 10 pounds of ammonium nitrate can do:

“Ten pounds could take out, certainly take out a classroom,” said Donald Sachtleben, an FBI Bomb Technician with the Indianapolis FBI Field Office.

I stand by my argument.

Stopped at the Last Second

Yet another tale of a last-second intervention: A guy in Austria walks into the US Embassy with a sack of grenades and nails:

A Bosnian man carrying a bag of hand grenades and nails has been arrested after trying to enter the US Embassy in Vienna.

He was detained after a metal detector alarm sounded as he attempted to walk into the building, according to reports.

He dropped the backpack, fled on foot, but was arrested a short distance away. The bag also contained Islamic literature, Austrian police say.

"There were a lot of nails in that bag. Had it exploded, it would have had an enormous shrapnel effect," Doris Edelbacher, of Austria's counterterrorism office, said.

Great news, everything worked out, except...

It was only the last layer of security that stopped him. You can't count on last-second stops as a prevention strategy.

U.S. Chlorine Tank Thefts

There are some eyebrow-raising developments in the chlorine-bomb threat. Nothing is certain, but the signs tend to point one way. From USA Today:

The Chlorine Institute, a trade group that represents more than 200 companies that make and distribute chlorine, recently alerted the FBI to several thefts or attempted thefts of 150-pound chlorine tanks from water treatment plants in California.

However...

There is no intelligence indicating such an attack is imminent or that terrorists have stolen any chlorine from the nation's chemical or water treatment plants, which use chlorine to purify drinking water.

And yet...

Robert Stephan, Homeland Security's infrastructure protection chief, says department officials are briefing bomb squads, urging plants to tightly guard their chlorine supplies and sharing photographs of unexploded truck bombs with police chiefs.

This is the definition of a predictable surprise. The indications have been there for months. Local homeland security professionals would be wise to share information on this threat and ensure that stocks of chlorine (and other dangerous chemicals) are secured and that they're prepared to respond to any sort of chemical event.

Beyond Chlorine: A Nitric Acid Bomb in Iraq

Insurgents in Iraq are getting better at building chlorine-release bombs, reports Global Security Newswire:

Victims in the [early chlorine] attacks were initially injured or killed by explosives rather than the gas. Since January, however, the composition of the [chlorine] bombs — the way they are assembled — has begun to change.

Along with casualties caused by the explosions, gas spread by the bombs sickened and sent scores to the hospital, Assistant Homeland Security Secretary Robert Stephen said. "There’s an increasing sophistication as we see these folks experiment," he said. "This is something that is troubling to us."

Analysts are studying how insurgents have altered their techniques to achieve more effective release of the chlorine, which has come from chemical depots and industrial sites in Iraq, Stephen said.

And now they're starting to try other chemicals.

An attempt to explode a truck carrying nitric acid at a military checkpoint in Iraq failed yesterday when the vehicle overturned before reaching its target, Reuters reported

The tactic mirrors recent bombings in which tanks of chlorine have been loaded on to car bomb.

This is just a couple of days after U.S. troops found a cache of nitric acid - 3000 gallons of it - during a raid in Baghdad:

U.S. forces in Iraq discovered stocks of nitric acid Saturday when they raided a Baghdad home, the Washington Times reported April 16.

Nitric acid can be used to make conventional explosives, but could have chemical weapon applications as well.

"It's an acid and causes chemical burns to the skin and burns the lungs and esophagus if it is inhaled," said Sgt. 1st Class Douglas Wallace of a U.S. Stryker brigade.

Neighbors alerted U.S. troops to the 31 barrels of chemicals ...

The important news here is that al Qaeda in Iraq is learning and adapting. Most if not all of the chlorine bombs in Iraq have been linked to al Qaeda. (I haven't yet found a direct link between the nitric acid and al Qaeda, but it's not an unreasonable supposition.) And they share tactical and operational information very well via the Internet. In a globally connected world, domestic risk increases when insurgents improve their tactical capabilities overseas, as DHS' Robert Stephen points out:

One of [DHS'] goals is educating local U.S. law enforcement about the hallmarks of the improvised bombs to better protect against such a tactic being used domestically.

In addition to law enforcement, I'd add a few others to the list. They certainly have an interest in this:

• Fire Departments (esp. HAZMAT teams)
• EMTs
• Security managers at chemical facilities, water treatment facilities, transportation companies, etc.
• Public health agencies

Prevention and response require collaborative effort.

HSPD-19: Combating Terrorist Use of Explosives in the United States

The White House recently released Homeland Security Presidential Directive 19 (HSPD-19): "Combating Terrorist Use of Explosives in the United States."

Just a couple of notes here. First, the directive emphasizes explosives detection. One of its requirements is the development of a national strategy "on how more effectively to deter, prevent, detect, protect against, and respond to explosive attacks." Some of the specific requirements for the new strategy are:

• an inventory and description of all current Federal Government assets and capabilities specifically relating to the detection of explosives or the protection against or response to explosive attacks

• an inventory and description of current research, development, testing, and evaluation initiatives relating to the detection of and protection against explosives and anticipated advances in capabilities for reducing the threat of explosive attacks

• recommendations for improved detection of explosive chemical compounds, precursor chemicals used to make improvised explosive chemical compounds, and explosive device components

• an assessment of the effectiveness of, and, as necessary, recommendations for improving Federal Government training and education initiatives relating to explosive attack detection, including canine training and performance standards

Trying to detect explosives is a risky strategy. It assumes that someone has already made the bomb, or has acquired the precursors for it. There may not be much time between the making of the bomb and its deployment.

The HSPD also has some directives for information-sharing at all levels (and with the private sector), which is good to see. I'm a little leery of the "build it and they will come" philosophy which seems to underlie these instructions, though:

The Attorney General, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Director of National Intelligence, shall maintain and make available to Federal, State, local, territorial, and tribal law enforcement entities, and other first responders at the discretion of the Attorney General, a web‑based secure portal that includes information on incidents involving the suspected criminal misuse of explosives, including those voluntarily reported by State, local, territorial, and tribal authorities.

The Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Attorney General, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Secretaries of State and Defense, shall maintain secure information-sharing systems that make available to law enforcement agencies, and other first responders at the discretion of the Secretary of Homeland Security, information, including lessons learned and best practices, concerning the use of explosives as a terrorist weapon and related insurgent war fighting tactics ...

As experience with the old Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) has shown, just building an IT network or portal doesn't guarantee that it will be used. Simply making the information systems available is usually not enough. (See these two posts.)

Another Chlorine Bomb Attack in Iraq

Al Qaeda continues to work on the "chlorine truck bomb" attack:

Insurgents with two chlorine truck bombs attacked a local government building in Falluja in western Iraq on Wednesday, the latest in a string of attacks using the poisonous gas, the U.S. military said.

It said 15 Iraqi and U.S. soldiers were wounded in the blasts and many more suffered chlorine poisoning.

"Numerous Iraqi soldiers and policemen are being treated for symptoms such as labored breathing, nausea, skin irritation and vomiting that are synonymous with chlorine inhalation," a U.S. statement said.

U.S. commanders and the Iraqi government have blamed al Qaeda militants for several recent attacks using chlorine gas in Anbar.

The U.S. military said it discovered an al Qaeda car bomb factory last month near Falluja with chlorine tanks.

Given the wide availability of chlorine in the U.S., a chlorine attack may be attractive to jihadists if and when they decide to attack the U.S. again. They wouldn't have to import anything - they could just use what's already here, just as they did on 9/11. The fact that they keep trying chlorine attacks in Iraq suggests that they see a strategic benefit from this type of attack, and they want to refine their methods. They also share information on tactics and methods over the Internet, so any successes in Iraq could be replicated elsewhere.

Here are a few questions for local homeland security professionals:

• Where are the stocks of chlorine or other dangerous chemicals in your area?
  
• What healthcare resources are available if an attack like this were to happen?
  
• Are first responders prepared for this type of event?

See this post and this post on the earlier chlorine attacks in Iraq.

More Chlorine Attacks in Iraq

They did it again ... three times.

Three suicide bombers driving trucks rigged with tanks of toxic chlorine gas struck targets in heavily Sunni Anbar province including the office of a Sunni tribal leader opposed to al-Qaida. The attacks killed at least two people and sickened 350 Iraqi civilians and six U.S. troops, the U.S. military said Saturday.

The violence started about 4:11 p.m. Friday when a driver detonated explosives in a pickup truck carrying chlorine at a checkpoint northeast of the provincial capital of Ramadi, wounding one U.S. service member and one Iraqi civilian, the military said in a statement.

Two hours later a dump truck exploded in Amiriyah, south of Fallujah, killing two policemen and leaving as many as 100 residents with symptoms of chlorine exposure ranging from minor skin and lung irritations to vomiting, the military said.

Another suicide bomber detonated a dump truck containing a 200-gallon chlorine tank rigged with explosives at 7:13 p.m. three miles south of Fallujah in the Albu Issa tribal region, the military said. U.S. forces found about 250 local civilians, including seven children, suffering from symptoms related to chlorine exposure, according to the statement. Police said the bomb was targeting the reception center of a tribal sheik who has denounced al-Qaida.

Four other bombings have released chlorine gas since Jan. 28 ... The primary effect of the chlorine attacks has been to spread panic. Although chlorine gas can be fatal, the heat from the explosions can render the gas nontoxic. Victims in the recent chlorine blasts died from the explosions, and not the effects of the gas.

They haven't gotten big casualty counts out of these things - and when you use pickup trucks and dump trucks as your delivery vehicles, you're probably not going to get much. But the fact that they continue to use chlorine as a weapon may indicate a willingness to go through the learning curve.

It's worth noting that these three attacks took place in Anbar province, where al Qaeda has a well-documented presence. Also, two of the targets were al Qaeda opponents.

This is worth watching. (Also see this post.)

Updated: Makeshift Chemical Attack in Iraq

In Iraq today, a chlorine tanker truck exploded in a makeshift chemical attack. Reuters reported:

A bomb destroyed a truck carrying chlorine north of Baghdad on Tuesday, killing at least five people and spewing out toxic fumes that left nearly 140 others sick, Iraqi police said.

It was not immediately clear if the chlorine truck blast was caused by a roadside bomb that hit the truck or if the vehicle itself was rigged with explosives as a makeshift chemical gas bomb.

One source at police headquarters said the truck was rigged with explosives ... A second police source also said the bomb was on the truck.

The bomb exploded near a restaurant at a rest stop on the main highway in Taji, 20 km (12 miles) north of Baghdad.

Insurgents and jihadists in Iraq have blown up gas trucks and gas stations before, but this is the first I've heard of anybody in Iraq using an IED to release deadly chemicals. If the bombs were in fact on the truck, then there's no question that their intent was to release the chlorine. Iraq is a real-world testing ground for terrorism, so it's worth noting whether this becomes a trend. It's not a good thing for terrorists to develop this capability.

Chlorine is nasty stuff, but it's used in water treatment, so it's loaded into railcars and tanker trucks that crisscross the U.S. every day. It's a vulnerability for sure. An oft-quoted study by the Naval Research Laboratory said that a worst-case chlorine leak from a railcar could kill up to 100,000 people in Washington D.C. (It's worth noting that TSA has proposed new rules for securing railcars, however.)

Update 2007-02-21: One day later, they did it again, with some success. Not good news:

Insurgents exploded a truck carrying chlorine gas canisters Wednesday — the second such "dirty" chemical attack in two days ... a pickup truck carrying chlorine gas cylinders was blown apart, killing at least five people and sending more than 55 to hospitals gasping for breath and rubbing stinging eyes, police said.

Some authorities believe militants could be trying to maximize the panic from their attacks by adding chlorine or other noxious substances.

"It is an indication of maliciousness, a desire to injure and kill innocent people in the vicinity," said [Lt. Col. Christopher] Garver, who also predicted militants may begin to launch similar attacks because of the widespread mayhem caused by this week's chlorine clouds.

Update 2007-03-02: Terrorism Focus looks closely at the trend of insurgent chemical attacks, suggesting that it's unclear if this trend is likely to continue, and that measures may be taken in Iraq to secure large supplies of chlorine:

Fortunately, the potential supply of chlorine suitable for such attacks will not allow groups to employ the agent in significant quantities indefinitely. Although there are numerous potential sources of chlorine in Iraq, future large-scale attacks can be kept at a minimum if bulk access points are kept under proper controls and distributions monitored.

The same precautions need to be ensured here, at all times, by local authorities. The threat of accidental or intentional chemical release is an issue for every community. A chlorine leak is a real possibility for any community that has a water treatment plant, and/or a highway or railroad running through it.

Boston's Aqua Teen Misadventure

Wednesday's news out of Boston, where the city came to a virtual standstill after city officials were notified of some suspicious objects - which later turned out to be "guerilla marketing" signs promoting a cartoon called Aqua Teen Hunger Force - is intriguing for a number of reasons.

First, a few basics of the case. Cartoon Network hired a marketing firm to come up with a "guerilla marketing" promotion for the trendy cartoon. The marketing firm created some light-up signs depicting characters from the cartoon (which looked a lot like Lite-Brite displays), then hired some people in various cities to plant them where they would be seen, such as "train stations, overpasses, 'hip and trendy areas, high traffic areas of high visibility'" (which only makes sense if you're trying to draw attention to your cartoon). The AP reported:

The first device was found at a subway and bus station underneath Interstate 93, forcing the shutdown of the station and the highway.

Later, police said four calls, all around 1 p.m., reported devices at the Boston University Bridge and the Longfellow Bridge, both of which span the Charles River, at a Boston street corner and at the Tufts-New England Medical Center.

The package near the Boston University bridge was found attached to a structure beneath the span, authorities said.

Subway service across the Longfellow Bridge between Boston and Cambridge was briefly suspended, and Storrow Drive was closed as well. A similar device was found Wednesday evening just north of Fenway Park, police spokesman Eddy Chrispin said.

So ... people notice the signs, think they look suspicious, call the police - and all hell breaks loose for the rest of the day.

Meanwhile, the marketing agency - in a truly dumb and irresponsible move - told its people in Boston to remain quiet, even as the city was locking down.

According to an e-mail one friend provided to the Globe, the executive at Interference Inc. told the artist, whom the agency had hired to install the small, battery-powered light screens in Boston, to remain silent, even as dozens of police officers collected the devices and shut down highways, subway lines, and part of the Charles River.

The executive asked Peter Berdovsky to "pretty please keep everything on the dl," slang for down low, or hush-hush, according to the message Berdovsky sent to his friends.

The city virtually shuts down, countless people are inconvenienced, the police and everyone else goes on high alert - and later in the day, the marketing company finally comes clean that it's just a promotion. There's no danger.

But, what's more, the company paid other people in other cities to plant the signs there. And in some cities, the signs had been there for 2-3 weeks - with not a single complaint. No one in New York reported any problems with the 41 signs there:

Not one New York City resident made a 911 emergency call in response to the promotion here Wednesday -- and, unlike Beantown, Manhattan has really been the target of terrorist attacks.

Portland responded "with a yawn," though maybe that had to do with the placement of the signs:

Portlanders have reported finding at least three of the devices that caused a minor panic in Boston, but reacted with a yawn, if that.

They were found in some of the trendier neighborhoods and were not near bridges or other infrastructure.

It's sensible that, if the people in Portland didn't place the signs near any key infrastructure elements, there would be less perception of a threat (unlike Boston). But ... if the placement of the signs were the determining factor, wouldn't you expect that Seattle would have had the same problem as Boston? At least one sign was posted on a bridge there:

Some of the same blinking electronic devices that threw a scare into the city of Boston today (Wednesday) have been found and removed from Seattle and several suburbs.

Police say the removal was low-key in Seattle.

One was found yesterday (Tuesday) by a Woodinville Public Works Department crew working on a rail trestle over State Highway 202.

Hmm ... and there was nothing to report in Atlanta:

Joe Cobb, Atlanta Police Department public information officer, said his department was unaware of the devices and had received no complaints.

In San Francisco it was also a non-event:

San Francisco police say 20 blinking signs advertising a cartoon show were scattered in various city neighborhoods without causing a stir.

Apparently no one had yet gotten around to placing any of the signs in Los Angeles:

None of the devices, which were planned to be placed around the Westside of Los Angeles, including Hollywood, West Hollywood and Santa Monica, had been reported found.

And although all of these cities seemed to shrug it off, the signs raised the ire of public officials in two cities: Philadelphia ...

When city officials learned little devices equipped with circuit boards and batteries were spread across Philadelphia, managing director Pedro Ramos and officials with the Mayor's office began combing the streets.

Ramos said the signs are illegal and those responsible will be punished.

... and Chicago:

They were recovered from elevated stations and storefronts…

And the city may seek monetary reimbursement from the marketing company responsible for planting them, said Supt. Philip Cline.

So ... the signs were considered a huge problem in Boston, a nuisance in Philadelphia and Chicago, and no big deal anywhere else. Philadelphia and Chicago want to be reimbursed for the trouble of finding and removing the signs.

And the prosecutor in Boston has prosecution on his mind - presumably, on charges of launching a full-blown terrorist hoax:

Assistant Attorney General John Grossman said bomb squad members who examined the lighted signs immediately detected three components that suggested the contraptions could be bombs. He said the black signs, about the size of a laptop computer, had what appeared to be a duct-tape wrapped package with a wire running into it and a power source, which would be needed to detonate a bomb.

"The devices looked like bombs" and had an "ominous nature," Grossman said.

While recognizing the fact that public authorities have to respond to any possible threat that's called in, a few questions come to mind:

1. Even without hearing from the marketing company, why didn't officials in Boston more quickly recognize that these things weren't bombs? It took hours for bomb-squad experts to see these things for what they were? Yes, there were batteries and wires, but these devices really weren't planted like an IED typically would be. Generally speaking, when you're planting an IED, you want it to blend in with its surroundings. You hide it in a backpack, or in a garbage can, or under a pile of garbage. You don't put blinking lights on it and place it in plain sight.
2. What effect will this have on "See Something, Say Something" efforts? Will people in Boston be as likely to report suspicious items if the result is a shutdown of the city, over something that turned out to be nothing at all?
3. If the guys in Boston (and here I'm talking about the guys who placed the signs, not the marketing agency who directed them) committed a crime, then what about the people who were hired to plant the signs in other cities? Did they commit the same crime? Or is the crime determined primarily by the degree to which public officials react to it? Did the guys in Boston commit a really serious crime, the guys in Chicago and Philadelphia commit a less serious crime, and the guys in Portland, New York, San Francisco, Seattle, etc., no crime at all?
4. Are we going to say that putting up signs like this is equivalent to, for instance, filling envelopes with white powder? Is it equivalent to calling in a bomb threat? Where do we draw the line?
5. How do authorities maintain vigilance without giving the appearance of crying wolf, when something like this happens? Every time that something like this happens, and there turns out to be no threat, people are going to be less and less inclined to respond to future warnings. It really is the "cry wolf" syndrome.
   

It's an interesting case, and one that indicates that there's a lot of Homeland Insecurity out there.

The Risk Right Here

There was some interesting testimony at last week's hearing of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Generally, there was a lot of old info, but some new info as well.

Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte discussed the likeliest threat:

Use of a conventional explosive continues to be the most probable al-Qa'ida attack scenario. … Nevertheless, we receive reports indicating that al-Qa'ida and other groups are attempting to acquire chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons or materials.

Lieutenant General Michael Maples, who's the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, provided more insight into probable WMD threats, as well as some of the more likely avenues of terrorist recruiting:

CBRN-related information is widely available, and if terrorists were to use unconventional materials in an attack, we believe they likely would use low-level biochemical agents such as ricin, botulinum toxin or toxic industrial chemicals such as cyanide. … We also judge that al Qaida and other terrorist groups have the capability and intent to develop and employ a radiological dispersal device.

Extremism throughout the West will continue to be spread primarily through radical clerics, the Internet, and in prisons.

Charlie Allen, the Chief Intelligence Officer at DHS, chimed in with some information on potential U.S. targets and additional info on terrorist recruiting:

We determine that transportation (particularly commercial aviation and mass transit) and commercial facilities remain the sectors most threatened by al-Qa'ida and its affiliates.

Our research indicates a variety of radicalizing influences, to include the role of charismatic extremist leaders, the spread of extremist propaganda through the Internet, the use of mass communication and multimedia, and more traditional person-to-person encounters, are among the key drivers that shape radicalization dynamics within the Homeland.

I thought the most interesting testimony was given by Phillip Mudd, who was appearing on behalf of Willie T. Hulon, the Executive Assistant Director of the FBI's National Security Branch (NSB). Mudd talked about the connections between terrorists and more ordinary criminal activities, the risk of homegrown terrorism, and the threat posed by Hezbollah:

Last year, we disrupted a homegrown Sunni Islamic extremist group in California known as the JIS, a.k.a. 'Assembly of Authentic Islam,' operating primarily in state prisons, without apparent connections or direction from outside the United States and no identifiable foreign nexus. Members of the JIS committed armed robberies in Los Angeles with the goal of financing terrorist attacks …

The radicalization of US Muslim converts is of particular concern. … converts appear to be more vulnerable and likely to be placed in situations that put them in a position to be influenced by Islamic extremists.

The Internet has facilitated the radicalization process, particularly in the United States, by providing access to a broad and constant stream of extremist Islamic propaganda, as well as experienced and possibly well connected operators via web forums and chat rooms.

US Hizballah associates and sympathizers primarily engage in a wide range of fundraising avenues in order to provide support to Hizballah to include criminal activities such as money laundering, credit card, immigration, food stamp, and bank fraud, as well as narcotics trafficking.

The UPI also reported on the hearing, adding some additional perspective from the participants on the use of the Internet to spread extremist ideologies. Mudd said:

The commonality we have (with Europe) is people who are using the Internet or talking among friends who are part of what I would characterize as a Pepsi jihad ... It's become popular among youth, and we have this phenomenon in the United States.

So that you have a kid in Georgia, a kid in California, a kid in Kansas, he may see the same images from Iraq, from Palestine, from Afghanistan, from Pakistan, that someone in Indonesia or Saudi Arabia sees, and he may be infected the same way with an ideology that says the use of violence against innocents is okay.

But, the UPI reported, others point out that there is a generally small risk of a group of young people becoming radicalized over the Internet and then launching a catastrophic attack, without any further connections or training:

"It's ridiculous to think that the U.S. or any other military would do its training over the Internet," said analyst and author Peter Bergen, arguing al-Qaida was just as professional in its approach. "Radicalization is one thing, having operational cells with the capacity to launch attacks is something else entirely.

"That basically means people who have been through one of the (terrorist training) camps."

Bergen said that the homegrown plots uncovered in the United States so far appeared to lack that thread back to al-Qaida central, which was one reason why he said they had been "pretty pathetic ... not much of a threat."

Most Likely WMD Scenario?

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) recently issued a report indicating that the most likely WMD terrorist threat involves a radioactive dispersal device, or "dirty bomb," the Globe and Mail reported.

The CSIS even goes so far as to say that it's surprising that no one has yet used this mode of attack:

Canada's spy agency says it is “quite surprising” that terrorists have not detonated a crude radioactive bomb, given the availability of materials and ease with which they could be made into a weapon.

But the CSIS study cautions that “a determined and resourceful terrorist group” could execute more elaborate forms of nuclear or radiological attack.

“The technical capability required to construct and use a simple RDD is practically trivial, compared to that of a nuclear explosive device or even most chemical or biological weapons,” the CSIS study says.

A homemade radiological weapon could consist of a conventional explosive laced with radioactive material commonly found at universities, medical and research laboratories or industrial sites.

The intelligence service points to the notion terrorist thinking has shifted from the desire to inflict mass casualties to “one of inflicting severe economic damage.”

It's not news that an RDD is a more likely mode of attack than a nuclear weapon. It's important to note, though, that the CSIS is seeing terrorists as pursuing economic aims rather than bodycounts. This has long been a key element of al Qaeda's strategy, as Brian Michael Jenkins pointed out in his excellent book, Unconquerable Nation:

Lest anyone misunderstand the purpose of jihad and consider it a form of spiritual calisthenics, bin Laden is explicit: “It is a religious-economic war,” he says. ... He argues that the United States can be brought down by destroying its economy.

Al Qaeda, in its view, brought down the Soviet Union by draining its economy through the Afghan war. It seeks to do the same thing to the United States.

The "Other" Terrorists

It can be tempting to think primarily of terrorists as al Qaeda types. But a recent terrorist case in Tennessee demonstrates that other threats are still out there. The AP reported:

A white supremacist was sentenced Nov. 28 to 30 years in prison for attempting to acquire Sarin nerve gas and C-4 explosives that he planned to use to destroy government buildings.

Demetrius Van Crocker, 40, a farmhand from the small town of McKenzie, Tenn., near Jackson, was arrested in 2004 after an FBI undercover agent posing as an employee at the Pine Bluff Arsenal in Arkansas, delivered a water-filled Sarin canister and a small quantity of explosives.

Crocker appeared to be obsessed with poisonous chemicals and showed an above-average knowledge of basic chemistry, which he said he acquired while working in an electroplating factory.

"I ain't gonna quit trying," he said of his desire to acquire a dirty bomb.

When he talked about casualties, Crocker said they "can't be helped." In a separate conversation with an informant, he said, "Let God sort 'em out."

The online magazine Salon also reported on the story, although in a more politicized way. Their article provided some of the backstory on how local authorities found out about Crocker:

According to court documents, the investigation of Demetrius Crocker began in early 2004, around the time he told a man named Lynn Adams that Timothy McVeigh "[did] things right." Adams, who had met the Mississippi-born farmhand through a mutual acquaintance, began to hear from Crocker about his plans for mass murder.

Adams was a former sheriff's deputy and a confidential informant for the Carroll County drug task force. At first, Adams didn't take Crocker seriously, but as their relationship progressed, Adams began believing Crocker was more than just talk.

At that point, the Carroll County Sheriff's Department passed the case on to the FBI. Steve Burroughs, an FBI agent, began working undercover.

But tapes of the conversations between Crocker and Burroughs reveal that Crocker knew what he was doing. He had made a version of Zyklon B, the gas used in the gas chambers in Nazi concentration camps, and he accurately described its manufacture. He had made nitroglycerin. He had the ingredients for a rudimentary bomb in his home ...

The Crocker case was brought in by old-fashioned police work. A confidential informant passed on a tip and a sting was conducted by an FBI agent careful to make sure the plan was real and not a creation of the government.

One of the truths of today's terrorism is that technology is making it easier for small groups and "lone wolf" terrorists to do much more damage than they could in the past. This is true for both Islamist terrorists like al Qaeda as well as others.

FBI Arrests Mall-Bombing Suspect

Just a news byte:

An informant's tip led the FBI to arrest a suspect who allegedly intended to set off hand grenades in a Rockford, Illinois shopping mall.

The Chicago Sun-Times reported that he was a Muslim convert who had aspirations of being a jihadist. The informant was a friend who tipped off the FBI.

Update Dec. 11, 2006: As CBS reported, it's clear that they arrested this suspect, Derrick Shareef, well before he could do any serious damage. He was acting alone, with scarce finances. In short, he didn't yet have the means of carrying out an attack, though he apparently had the desire:

As depicted by [U.S. Attorney for Northern Illinois Patrick] Fitzgerald, Shareef was predisposed to violence but devoid of cash; a dangerous man who freely chatted about bombing a county courthouse, a city hall, a federal building, and then the mall.

"He did not have the money to buy the grenades. He was gonna hock and barter two stereo speakers to the undercover to buy the grenades," Fitzgerald said, proof Shareef was not directed or financed from overseas.

So Shareef fits a pattern of indicted "wanna be" terrorists with big ideas but no apparent means or backing from our real enemies.

The FBI has been paying special attention to those inspired by al-Qaeda, like the London subway bombers:

The FBI's Special Agent in Charge of its Chicago field office, Robert Grant, standing next to Fitzgerald on Friday, explained the nation's shift from investigating al-Qaeda to al Qaeda–inspired plotters.

"We've been focused for about two years on those types of domestic cells that could develop or individuals," Grant said.

Communication, Communication, Communication

Disaster communication is in the news.

The CDC has released an online guide for disaster communications in the early hours after a major incident involving biological or chemical agents, radiation, or suicide bombings:

The guide provides message templates for local leaders to communicate with the public:

The messages were written to be used by federal public health officials and to be adapted for the use of state and local public health officials during a terrorist attack or suspected attack. Use these messages as follows:

• To communicate with the public during a terrorist attack or a suspected attack
• To adapt for a specific event (These messages were written for fictitious situations, so assumptions were made about an event.)
• To provide information during the first hours of an event
• To save precious moments during the initial response time and to buy the time necessary for public health leaders to develop more specific messages

My only complaint about the guide is that it isn't organized in a very user-friendly fashion. You have to click around a bit to find what you're looking for.

In other news, Government Technology reported on Washington D.C. mayor Anthony Williams' efforts to increase subscriptions for the city's text-message alert system, which would send them information and updates in the event of an emergency. (San Francisco recently created a similar system.)

In order to make the process easier, individuals can now sign up by simply texting 32362 (D-C-E-M-A) from any cellular device.

"This new rapid enrollment feature means people who want to register for the system don't need access to the Internet or e-mail to sign up for alerts," said Williams. "Signing up for emergency alerts is as easy as using a cell phone -- and it can really pay off when there is any kind of emergency in your neighborhood."

DC Text Alert allows citizens to receive emergency messages about an event on any text-capable device -- cell phone, computer -mail, pagers, and PDAs. ... Currently, 23,000 individuals have registered for the system, which was inaugurated in June 2004.

On another subject, the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) released its biennial report (available for purchase only) . In a press release, NEMA summarized some of the survey's main findings:

Unfortunately, these growing [state] responsibilities that are mandated by the federal government are not supported by adequate funding.

There are positive findings as well. An overwhelming majority of states – 46 – are making use of established standards to assess capabilities and address shortfalls in their state emergency management programs. ... Standards would result in a more comprehensive emergency management program at the local level, which would mean greater capability when a disaster occurs.

The Biennial Report shows that the mutual aid system in the U.S. continues to strengthen. The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), a national mutual aid agreement that allows support across state lines when a disaster occurs, played a key role in the Hurricanes Katrina and Rita response. By spring 2006, the compact had deployed nearly 66,000 people from 48 states, at a cost of more than $830 million.

Thirty-five states now have established similar structures within their own borders. These intrastate agreements allow jurisdictions to help one another while having provisions in place to address reimbursement, liability and workers compensation issues. Thirty-six states also have a regional mutual aid mechanism in place. This bodes well for faster, stronger and more efficient disaster response and recovery.

Government Computer News reported that the full NEMA survey estimated that the full cost of statewide systems for communication interoperability will be about $7 billion:

The National Governor's Association also tackled the issue of interoperability, in its recent issue brief: "Strategies for States to Achieve Public Safety Wireless Interoperability." The short report is worth reading, if only for the best practices that it found among the states for promoting interoperable communications (an example of the federal system at work). But generally, the NGA found that there is a lot of important work to do:

The lack of interoperable communications continues to be a serious, pressing public safety problem that severely undermines the ability of first responders to operate effectively during an mergency situation.

Five key issues underlie the current status of interoperability among public safety agencies in this country:

• incompatible and aging communications equipment;
• limited and fragmented funding;
• limited and fragmented planning;
• a lack of coordination and cooperation; and
• inadequate and fragmented radio spectrum.

But here's one good thing: The NGA emphasizes that local agencies should be closely involved in any state effort to promote interoperability:

Providing local representation on the governance body and in interoperability planning is a critical. The state governance board that oversees the development of public safety wireless communications should include local public safety agency requirements for emergency communications. Local officials should be included in planning and decision making early.

Generally, anything that improves communication, either among first responders or between first responders and the public, can only be a good thing. Communication problems were significant in the aftermath of Katrina and 9/11. It's a problem that has lingered too long.

IDF Finds Liquid-Explosive Suicide Belts

The Jerusalem Post reports that the Israel Defense Forces have uncovered a West Bank terror cell that had created suicide belts that used liquid explosives, which are undetectable by metal detectors.

Maritime Terror Risks

The RAND Corporation released a new report yesterday, Maritime Terrorism: Risk and Liability. The authors used a threat-vulnerability-consequence methodology and concluded that the greatest risks in terms of threat and vulnerability are:

• Ferries: Onboard bombings
• Cruise Ships: Onboard bombings (followed closely by standoff artillery assauts and food or water contamination)
• Cargo Ships: Radiological Dispersal Device (i.e., dirty bomb)