A Useful Terrorist Profile

There still isn't one.

A new joint security alert from the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI warns that terrorists are increasingly turning to women and teenagers to carry out suicide bombings.

The bulletin, obtained by CBS News, says “Female suicide bombers conducted more than twice as many attacks in Iraq in the first six months of 2008 than in all of 2007”.

US intelligence analysts also say Islamic radicals are enlisting greater numbers of teenagers for their deadliest missions.

It's not who they are; it's what they do.

Senate Report on Homegrown Terrorism

I don't really have much to say about the new Senate report on homegrown terrorism and Internet recruiting, because it covers ground that I've covered before.

But after 10 pages - more than half the report - describing al Qaeda's sophisticated media, communications and marketing campaigns, this stuck out like a sore thumb:

[T]he U.S. government has not developed nor implemented a coordinated outreach and communications strategy to address the homegrown terrorist threat, especially as that threat is amplified by the use of the Internet. According to testimony received by the Committee, no federal agency has been tasked with developing or implementing a domestic communications strategy. While there are a series of outreach efforts being pursued by federal agencies, those efforts are limited, isolated, and not part of a strategic, government-wide policy to significantly minimize the influence of violent Islamist ideology in the United States. ...

And finally, the efforts by DHS' Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) and the FBI’s Community Relations Unit are not tied into programs administered by local police departments, some of which are quite comprehensive.

Lesson to local law enforcement and homeland security professionals: If it is to be, it is up to you. (Be countersubversive.)

It's worth remembering that, while someone can be radicalized via the Internet, two things remain true:

1. Radicalization involves a separation from society, so if recruits can be pulled back into the real world of family and society, the process can be reversed.

2. Before recruits can become a legitimate threat, they need tactical skills. To some extent these are available via the Internet (e.g., bomb recipes). But for larger, high-yield attacks, they need to coordinate with others, raise money, and perhaps acquire specialized training. Making these connections and participating in this type of training can be a significant vulnerability for them, as it requires them to leave the relative safety of the virtual world.

A Shift in Counterterrorism Communication Strategy

Matthew Levitt and Michael Jacobson write in PolicyWatch that the U.S. counterterrorism strategy has recently undergone a shift.

Where, previously, the emphasis was on selling the U.S. as "the good guys" (Remember Charlotte Beers? Remember Karen Hughes?), the emphasis now is on demonstrating the degree to which al Qaeda and its fellow travelers are "the bad guys":

Today contesting al-Qaeda's ideology is an integral part of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy.

Efforts now concentrate on discrediting the terrorists. The United States has gone about this using a two-fold approach. As National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) director Michael Leiter suggests, the United States is trying to point out "how bankrupt" al-Qaeda's ideology is, and demonstrate that "it is al-Qaeda, and not the West, that is truly at war with Islam" by highlighting the extent to which Muslims are victims of the organization's attacks.

In general, the United States is trying to highlight the fact that al-Qaeda is a merciless and cruel organization whose tactics -- such as deploying mentally deficient people as suicide bombers -- are repugnant. As Leiter argued, "showing the barbarism of groups like al-Qaeda in the light of truth is, ultimately, our strongest weapon."

This message can have some traction - for instance, we've already seen evidence of this in the eventual Sunni rejection of al Qaeda for its horrific practices in Iraq.

In a way it's basic politics: Demonize your opposition.

For the strategy to be effective, this message needs to work on the local level. The homegrown threat, which was discussed in this post on Tuesday, can be countered by demonstrating the bankruptcy of al Qaeda's ideology. Trusted Muslim leaders can be a vital ally, as they are best able to formulate counter-arguments that are based on an Islamic perspective. These arguments can have real weight against the "cut-and-paste" version of Islam that is taught by the usually self-taught radicalizers (see this post).

Europol: Jihadist Recruiting Is Improving

Europol has released the 2008 version of its EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report. A few noteworthy highlights regarding terrorist recruiting, via Terrorism Monitor:

The Europol report underscores several interesting trends in Islamist terrorism in Europe:

First, “although the majority of all arrested suspects for Islamist terrorism continue to be North African citizens, the member states reported a high number of arrested suspects with the nationality of the country of arrest.” This seems to confirm a growing threat of homegrown terrorism that has been observed for several years.

Second, this increase in homegrown terrorists is partly the result of an increase in quantity and a “new quality” in jihadi propaganda in Europe (see Terrorism Focus, February 20). It is now widely recognized that propaganda on the internet has a central importance in recruitment. Hence, some recent developments appear particularly worrisome. For instance, al-Qaeda’s media arm, al-Sahab, now offers English subtitles or translations.

Recruitment constitutes an important part of jihadi activities in Europe and arrests related to this activity have increased. The observed developments in propaganda and recruitment suggest that al-Qaeda is taking roots in Europe and could potentially become stronger in the near future.

Third, propaganda and recruitment serve multiple purposes. Some would-be jihadis are recruited by local cells to carry out operations in their own countries. Some are “self-recruited” through the media, and constitute a “new generation” of terrorists. Some limit their support to financing terrorism. Others, finally, decide to join the jihad abroad, in Iraq—which remains the main destination for European fighters—in Afghanistan, or, increasingly (according to French intelligence), in Somalia.

Thoughts:

Anti-recruitment efforts are clearly important to winning the war against terrorism. As long as young people are drawn out of society into these violent groups, we'll always be fighting this war. It's imperative to ensure that young people have strong social bonds with those who eschew violence. Community policing can help law enforcement prevent and detect potential problems.

The "self-recruited" group who radicalize via the Internet is the hardest to prevent. Yet at the same time, they are the least likely to develop the higher-order tactical skills necessary to pull off a major attack. There is still a reliance on the expertise of experienced fighters. The critical thing is to cut off the connections between those hardened fighters and potential recruits.

Terror-School Dropouts

Michael Jacobson writes an important column in the Washington Post about terrorist dropouts - guys who sign up for al Qaeda or other groups, train, and in some cases, receive operational orders and weapons - only to back out and abandon the plot and/or group. Even one of the 9/11 hijackers, Ziad Jarrah, had to be cajoled not to abandon the plot.

Think of this as the flip-side to recruiting. If you understand why potential terrorists leave terrorist groups, this can inform your efforts to prevent them from joining in the first place. It can also help counter-terrorism efforts to create rifts in terrorist groups. Jacobson argues:

Figuring out why individuals walk away from terrorist groups can help governments predict whether an individual -- or even a cell -- is likely to go through with a plot. Understanding the dropouts should also make it easier for governments to determine which terrorists might be induced to switch sides, help stop radicalization and craft messages that could peel away people already in terrorist organizations. The more we know about why terrorists bail, the better we can fight them.

Potential terrorists have a variety of reasons for dropping out, but some general trends are evident:

We rightly think of al-Qaeda and other jihadist groups as formidable foes, but the stories of would-be killers who bail give us some intriguing clues about fault lines that counterterrorism officials should exploit. The reasons for a change of heart can be strikingly prosaic: family, money, petty grievances. But they can also revolve around shaken ideology or lost faith in a group's leadership.

Looking at al-Qaeda dropouts, some clear patterns emerge. Some left after becoming disillusioned with the group's tactics and strategy.

Another factor driving jihadists to drop out is a general lack of respect for the group's leadership. Essam al-Ridi testified during the embassy bombings trial that he resented having to take battlefield orders during the Afghan jihad from bin Laden and others who lacked military experience. For Ridi, the final straw was a battle in which many jihadists died -- in his view needlessly -- thanks to inept leadership, but that al-Qaeda nonetheless declared a victory. Jarrah, the 9/11 pilot, felt cut out by ringleader Mohamed Atta's leadership style.

Another reason bad guys bail out is money. Like the rest of us, some terrorists see inadequate compensation as a sign of unfair treatment.

Don't forget the role of petty slights, either. L'Houssaine Kherchtou [who trained to be bin Laden's personal pilot] grew bitter after a bin Laden aide turned down his request for $500 to cover the costs of his wife's Caesarean section -- and grew livid when al-Qaeda subsequently paid the expenses of a group of Egyptians sent to Yemen to renew their passports.

Not surprisingly, one of the biggest factors in dropping out is maintaining a social connection to family and friends outside the terror group. That's why recruiters always try to draw recruits out of their social and familial circles, replacing the old ties of family and friends with new relationships.

This is something that local authorities can observe and influence. There may be a potential threat in groups of individuals that separate themselves from family, friends, and society. By making contacts with trusted members of the larger community, local authorities can be on the lookout for such small groups:

The final factor seems to be good old family ties. Terrorists who maintain contact with friends and family outside their cell or organization seem more likely to drop out. This may be why [Mohammed] Atta forbade the 9/11 hijackers to contact their families to say goodbye. The wobbliest of the hijackers, Jarrah, resisted al-Qaeda calls to cut his ties with his fiancee in Germany and his family in Lebanon, souring his relationship with Atta, according to the 9/11 commission.

Something similar happened to two would-be 9/11 plotters, Mushabib al-Hamlan and Saud al-Rashid. Both men bailed out when they left the fanatical, insular atmosphere of the Afghan training camps and returned home to Saudi Arabia. After getting a visa to enter the United States, Hamlan contacted his family, despite clear al-Qaeda instructions to the contrary. He found out that his mother was ill and decided not to return to Afghanistan, despite intense pressure from his handlers. Hamlan later moved back in with his parents and returned to college.

In my view, preparedness means different things for different types of events. For a natural disaster, the emphasis must be on response and recovery. But for a terrorist event, the emphasis ought to be on prevention.

In this light, Jacobson is right that prevention ought to include studying those who leave terrorist organizations - to understand what pries them away from these groups and to help prevent successful recruitment into the groups in the first place.

Cat and Mouse

It's a few weeks old, but worth noting...this article in the Washington post discusses some of the ways terrorists have adapted to the attempts by law enforcement to sniff them out. They've become adept at evading some types of electronic surveillance, for example.

In an age of spy satellites, security cameras and an Internet that stores every keystroke, terrorism suspects are using simple, low-tech tricks to cloak their communications, making life difficult for authorities who had hoped technology would give them the upper hand.

Across Europe, al-Qaeda operatives and sympathizers are avoiding places that they assume are bugged or monitored, such as mosques and Islamic bookshops, counterterrorism experts said. In several cases, suspects have gone back to nature -- leaving the cities on camping trips or wilderness expeditions so they can discuss plots without fear of being overheard.

It's age-old stuff, really. Clandestine organizations have always used these tactics. But the rapid advance of technology has provided new options for evading detection:

Overall, terrorist cells around the world have become noticeably more skilled at avoiding detection, European counterterrorism officials and analysts said in interviews. For instance, operatives now commonly use Skype and other Internet telephone services, which are difficult to trace or bug.

At times, they have displayed a flair for creativity. Defendants convicted last April in a plot to blow up targets in London with fertilizer bombs communicated via chat rooms on Internet pornography sites in an effort to throw investigators off their trail, according to testimony.

Techniques run the gamut from advanced to rudimentary:

Often, suspects use simple, homemade codes in their exchanges. In a trial in the German city of Kiel, a Moroccan-German man charged in a separate case with recruiting suicide bombers to go to Iraq revealed in testimony in November some of the rudimentary ciphers that he and other cell members used in Internet chat forums.

"Taxi drivers," Redouane el Habab said, referred to suicide bombers; explosives were "dough." Anybody who had to go to "the hospital," he added, had been taken to jail, while those visiting "China" were really attending training camps in Sudan.

The bottom line is that, although these tactics make detection difficult, it is not impossible - and human intelligence is still critical:

"Unfortunately, the technology changes so quickly that we're always playing a catch-up game," the senior Italian official said. "The bottom line is that we'll have to work more and more with human sources."

Other Italian officials, however, said the trackers would always have one important advantage: Because conspirators must communicate, they will always be vulnerable to eavesdropping in some form.

"Many times I ask myself, how is it still possible to obtain important information if the suspects know we can do this?" said Spataro, the deputy chief public prosecutor in Milan.

The answer, he said, is that "as members of a criminal association, they have to speak, they have to communicate with each other, they have to make plans."

This sort of thing is why I've emphasized the recruiting process. Once a terrorist group - or any other criminal organization - is behind closed doors, its options for practicing deception increase. But when recruiting, they have to be more forthright with their communications. They are very cautious at the outset, of course, but eventually they have to show their hand.

Disrupting recruiting can also have the advantage of exploiting vulnerabilities in a pre-operational stage.

All Politics Is Global?

Here's an interesting paper out of Australia, arguing that terrorism has, in essence, reached the viral stage:

[W]e are not now dealing with some kind of well drilled, structured organisation where people are recruited into a hierarchy and they are trained and given high-level skills that allow them to pull off spectacular acts of terrorism. More and more, terrorists are amateurs. They may be relatively incompetent, but they are also unlikely to be part of a network. Such people are not recruited – they recruit themselves.

Hmm...yes and no.

There certainly are some self-recruited amateurs out there, but it's incorrect to assume that all potential terrorists are amateurs.

The paper's author, Waleed Aly, argues that Osama bin Laden understands the new nature of globalized terrorism. The evidence of his new understanding is his evolving mode of communication in his video and audio addresses:

[Bin Laden] is not dressed in military fatigues. He’s dressed in the golden robes of a statesman. He has carefully cultivated a more youthful, vital appearance. He is not, and for a long time, has not been issuing strategic advice or instructions. He is not identifying targets. He is not addressing somebody he knows personally and with details of the next operation and how it will be conducted. ... bin Laden’s mode of discourse is a motivational one. He is a motivational speaker now. He provides a political narrative for people, a narrative of inspiration, but he issues no direct instructions.

The upshot of this?

[T]errorists scarcely need to recruit anymore because we have entered a phase of self-radicalisation, of DIY terrorism.

We are not dealing with organisational structures. We are most truly dealing with a persuasion around which otherwise disconnected people can coalesce accidentally into a movement. These are people that often have wildly divergent ideologies, and often disagree vehemently with one another. They are not some uniform factory product. This is not some singular evil ideology, despite the now familiar insistence of various pundits and politicians. It is a persuasion that has converged on an expression of political violence at a given point in time.

Again, yes and no. Some plotters, such as the Fort Dix guys, are clearly beginners - DIY types. But it's naive to think that, because we're seeing some of these guys, that's all there is.

Organization is critical to marshaling forces and increasing capabilities. Terrorist organizations understand this as well as anyone, even if, for security reasons, they seek to establish small, self-contained operational groups.

Identity politics is central to forging, and fighting, such a persuasion. It is crucial to grasp this because it leads us to think of counterterrorism in new ways. Presently, the governmental focus is disproportionately on the pointy end of the terrorism process: finding people who are about to kill us and locking them up. And it is precisely because the more formative stages of this process are beyond the conventional gaze that the scope of the threat grows consistently.

A person might begin with deep local grievances, but quickly learn to give them a global meaning. This is the nature of liquid modernity, where space collapses and it is possible to plug into the grievances of antipodean communities, even virtual communities, instantly. With globalised information flows, I can now appropriate the grievances of Muslims from Europe, Asia or the Middle East as my own, and I can therefore construct an artificially unified story. The brilliance of demagogues like bin Laden is in their ability to exploit this; to impart upon people the tools to knit together global narratives of persecution out of their domestic grievances; to convince disconnected audiences that the frustration, exclusion and alienation they feel domestically is not merely a domestic problem, but is precisely the same oppression visited upon their co-religionists in Iraq, Israel, Chechnya or Kashmir, part of the same grand design.

No disagreement here. This is the danger of the metastasization of the terrorist threat - that the old adage "all politics is local" becomes turned on its head. (Or perhaps, more accurately, the newer adage, "Think global; act local" is expressed in malevolent ways.)

The implications for government policy are relatively clear. No longer can we maintain the convenient political fiction that it is possible to quarantine policy decisions, whether foreign or domestic, from issues such as the terror threat. It is clear that whatever actions we take, in whatever sphere we take them, can and do have an increasingly global resonance.

The reverse is also true. On the local level, we ought to understand how events in faraway places can have significant local impacts. In the battle of hearts and minds, we can engage this argument only when we see both the near and the far - how we affect and are affected by events around the corner and around the globe.

Preventing Radicalization: What's Important?

The Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) has posted the proceedings of an August seminar on the radicalization process. The focus was on radicalization by Islamist groups, though some of the findings could certainly be applied to other radical groups.

As I've written - or perhaps it's "harped on" - before, understanding the radicalization process is extremely important for anyone who's interested in preventing terrorism on the local level. Recognizing a threat that's still emerging - and intervening at an early stage - can be far more effective and productive than trying to play defense against an array of more mature threats.

Unfortunately, much of the DIIS discussion focused on the question of "Who is likely to become a radical?" which I think is not the most critical question. For example, DIIS concluded that key factors in the radicalization process are:

The perception of personal marginalization combined with the perception of Western double standards in foreign policy appears to play a crucial role.

Additionally, individuals often join radical groups for political or religious reasons and in a search for empowerment but also in search for friendship and a sense of social belonging.

That's all very nice. If you wish, you can go about looking for marginalized young people who feel that the world is against them and are searching for "friendship and a sense of social belonging," along with a sense of purpose and meaning for their lives. But given that you've just described teen angst itself, you'll end up with a list so long as to be useless.

More important, from the perspective of prevention, is "During the radicalization process, what techniques and activities leave detectable traces?"

Unlike operational terrorists, for whom avoiding detection is a high priority, recruiters have to stick their heads above the ground and find the young people DIIS describes. Studying the recruiting process and recognizing its techniques will result in a more focused investigation.

There were, however, a few highlights worth noting. Kamran Bokhari from Strategic Forecasting (Stratfor) - a former member of Hizb ut-Tahrir - pointed out one of the significant vulnerabilities of radical groups:

The radical groups ... are often characterized by a “revolving door” phenomenon. Very few of the individuals who join the groups stay there in the long run. This was the case for Kamran Bokhari himself.

Another worthwhile point was made by Marco Zannoni of the Dutch Institute for Safety, Security and Crisis Management, who argued that the de-radicalization process needs to be systemic and holistic:

Multiple tasks are to be handled in a de-radicalization process. A key point is to acknowledge that different authorities should undertake different tasks in any de-radicalization process at different points in the process. Any intervention involves multiple sets of tasks such as preparing, preventing, spotting, gathering information, monitoring, interpreting and responding to radicalized individuals.

For example the roles of a teacher or a social worker are quite different from the roles of the Police and those roles are crucial at different points in time. Any intervention should be targeted at an individual who might be radicalizing, but additional interventions are needed. Those have to be targeted towards the individual’s context/situation. Possible leads for radicalization, but also for intervention, can be found in the radicalizing/radicalized individual’s immediate surroundings: at school, at work or when they perform acts such as writing messages on the internet.

I was also curious about this nugget, found in the Recommendations section:

It is recommended to find inspiration in the confetti-approach/the New Dutch model, which consists of supporting many micro-projects.

I need to find out more about the "confetti approach." It sounds like a model for innovating new approaches and finding out what works.

Overall, the seminar's findings and recommendations are difficult to argue with. Who'd take issue, for instance, with the idea that:

There is a need to look into how trust can be created between authorities and relevant communities in order to make effective counter-measures...

At a strategic level, these sorts of discussions are worthwhile. On a more tactical level, you've got to ensure that your actions are focused on the right things. It helps to start with the right question.

Fight the Network, Not the Terrorist

Douglas Farah's post, "Why the Suicide Bomb Network Must be Dismantled," made me think more about a few recent incidents in which potential terrorist bombings have been prevented at more-or-less the last minute (e.g., London/Glasgow, Austria).

While it's comforting that no innocent lives were lost in these incidents, this is no way to fight a terrorist network. Farah also takes this view:

It is true that it is virtually impossible to halt the actual suicide bomber on his mission. But there are vulnerabilities in the network that create these human weapons. These areas can be far more easily attacked than the final product.

As Bob Baer, formerly of the CIA, recently wrote ... "this is an ideological battle that will be won, or lost, at the local mosque, at the family dinner table or between friends across the Islamic world."

Baer makes an important point here. Outsiders will not be able to "win" an ideological war between jihadists and nonviolent Muslims. But Jihadists are vulnerable in this ideological war, as the U.S. Military Academy's "Militant Ideology Atlas" pointed out:

The Jihadis lose credibility among mainstream Muslims when they attack women, children, and the elderly; damage the sources of a nation's wealth (such as tourism and oil); kill other Muslims; and declare other Muslims apostates.

(Also see my post on the Atlas.)

Evan Kohlmann also made a similar argument at the Counterterrorism Blog yesterday, pointing out that Algerian jihadists in the 1990s overreached and suffered backlash from the non-extremist population:

These men adopted a new philosophy that was, in short, "you are either with us or against us." According to Abu Hamza, "They classed the [faithful] Mujaahidin doing proper Islam as apostates. This was because they did not label every single person as a kaafir [infidel]… Anyone who differs with them, they call him a kaafir [infidel]."

In reflection, Abu Hamza al-Masri was deeply critical of these actions, referring to them as the equivalent of "shooting ourselves in the head": "This gave the enemies of jihaad a gun that they had never dreamed of having, ready pointed at us and loaded... This had far reaching consequences that sent an earthquake of instability among the adherents [of the mujahideen] and [their] aims. This worked beautifully for the enemies of Islam who were searching for a doorway or any angle to help them...in hopes that many people will leave the jihaad principles and the path of jihaad, only to seek reform through other means that are un-Islamic, like Democracy, Socialism, etc."

So there is an avenue for undermining the ideological legitimacy of the jihadists.

On the policing side, Farah goes on to argue, as I've also noted before, that some of the most vulnerable elements of a terrorist network are found in the recruiting and fundraising functions.

Imams that drum up volunteers-a key element. One that is often undertaken by mosques associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, particularly in Europe, and most noticeably in Great Britain.

Forgers almost always operate in networks, with different types of expertise working together. Another choke point.

Any of these chokepoints, from radicalization in mosques to radicalization in prison to cutting off the criminal enterprises that convey the suicide bombers to Iraq, are more efficient that hoping to stop the young person once they are one their way with a vest packed with explosives.

That's absolutely right.

The Nuclear Threat: A Close Look

The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) has just released the Securing the Bomb 2007 report on the threat of nuclear terrorism. The report focuses on the risk of detonation of a nuclear weapon, primarily by terrorists. It pays little comparatively attention to other nuclear risks such as "dirty bombs" or attacks/accidents at nuclear power facilities.

NTI makes clear, early on, that the risk is real. There are two main scenarios: Either a terrorist group steals or buys a nuclear weapon on the black-market (perhaps stolen from Russia or Pakistan), or a terrorist group acquires nuclear material (either highly enriched uranium [HEU] or plutonium) with the intent of making a nuclear weapon. For technical reasons, HEU would be the more likely choice, as HEU can be used in a simpler "gun" type device.

NTI makes clear that the risk is realistic, even if it's remote compared to other risks such as conventional explosives.

A terrorist's first problem would be acquiring the material. The good news is that they can't make it on their own - it's too technically difficult. But it may be possible to acquire it, especially through three potential avenues:

[I]t appears that the highest risks of nuclear theft today are in Russia, Pakistan, and at HEU-fueled research reactors.

Russia has the world’s largest stockpile of nuclear weapons and materials, and remains the only state in the world where authorities have confirmed that terrorists have been carrying out reconnaissance at nuclear warhead storage sites.

[I]n February 2006, Russian citizen Oleg Khinsagov was arrested (along with three Georgian accomplices) with some 100 grams of HEU enriched to 89% U-235. The arrest was part of a sting operation in which a Georgian government agent posed as an Islamist buyer for a “serious organization.”

The risk of theft is real:

Today, security for the world’s vast and widely distributed nuclear stockpiles varies enormously, from excellent to appalling.

[A] substantial number of incidents of actual theft of weapons-usable nuclear material have occurred. ... The IAEA database on nuclear smuggling includes 15 incidents of real theft and smuggling of separated plutonium or HEU confirmed by the states involved.

In Russia, Chechen terrorists (some of whom have close links to al Qaeda) have carried out reconnaissance at nuclear weapon storage sites.

Locally, the greatest risk comes from research reactors:

More than 140 research reactors around the world are still fueled by HEU (though usually in forms that would require modest chemical processing before the material could be used in a bomb), and many of these facilities have modest security in place—no more than a night watchman and a chain-link fence in some cases.

A majority of research reactors are either in the United States or Russia.

Even at U.S. research reactors - especially at universities - security is relatively low:

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) security rules for research reactors are remarkably weak. ... U.S. HEU-fueled research reactors regulated by the NRC continue to have only the most modest security measures in place.

[As of the end of 2007] there will be 19 remaining HEU-fueled research reactors in the United States, of which 8 are licensed by the NRC.

Most civilian research reactors have very modest security. Some are located on university campuses, where providing serious security against terrorist attack would be virtually impossible—and where many of the operators are students, who cycle through frequently, making it extraordinarily difficult to provide serious checks of potential insider thieves.

In mid-2005 an investigation by ABC News documented conditions ranging from sleeping guards to security doors propped open with books at nearly all of the 26 U.S. university-based research reactors, including those with HEU.

None of the U.S. NRC-regulated HEU-fueled research reactors should be considered adequately secured against plausible terrorist and criminal threats (though several have either very modest amounts of HEU on-site, or HEU that is quite radioactive).

Once weapons-capable nuclear material has been stolen, especially HEU, it's virtually impossible to detect and locate. Unlike many nuclear materials (such as the fuel for a nuclear power plant), HEU gives off relatively little radiation, making it possible to transport with only minimal shielding.

[O]nce nuclear material has been stolen, it could be anywhere, and all the subsequent layers of defense, unfortunately, are variations on looking for needles in haystacks.

Moreover, the radioactivity from these materials is weak and difficult to detect from any substantial distance. ... You still can’t detect a nuclear device unless you are close to it.

Radiation detectors ... would have essentially no chance of detecting “clean” HEU with even modest shielding.

Even the expensive new Advanced Spectroscopic Portals now being developed would not substantially improve the ability to detect shielded HEU.

As drug smugglers and illegal immigrants have amply shown, it is not hard to sneak into the United States:

The myriad routes across the world’s scantily protected borders make nuclear smuggling almost impossible to stop. ... Attempting to protect the United States from nuclear terrorism by detecting and stopping nuclear contraband at the U.S. borders is like a football team defending at its own goal line.

And although terrorists could not enrich uranium themselves, it is conceivable that they could develop and transport a crude weapon:

Terrorists would need about 50 kilograms (110 pounds) of HEU for the simplest gun-type bomb—an amount of material roughly the size of a six-pack.

Even before the Afghan war, U.S. intelligence concluded that “fabrication of at least a ‘crude’ nuclear device was within al-Qa’ida’s capabilities, if it could obtain fissile material.”

Even a fully assembled bomb of the crude type terrorists might make could fit in a truck, a fishing boat, a small plane, or the hold of a yacht.

So there is some level of realistic threat, despite the technical difficulties involved and the challenge of acquiring fissile material.

How to solve the problem? A lot of the potential solutions would be in the jurisdiction of agencies such as the Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission, along with the State Department and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for international efforts.

However, there is a local element to solving this problem. Police work is extremely important:

Almost all of the known interdictions have resulted from good police or intelligence work—from sting operations, or from people who became aware of the conspiracy deciding to inform the authorities. There are a wide range of steps that can and should be taken to strengthen international police and intelligence cooperation, to pursue additional demand stings (posing as buyers of nuclear material or expertise) and supply stings (posing as sellers), and to encourage the semi-feudal chieftains who control some of the world’s most dangerous borders to let us know about transports of nuclear material.

Some local police agencies have even provided security for local research reactors:

At the reactor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), since 9/11, there have been 1-2 Cambridge police officers with side-arms on-site to provide security—though these are not required by NRC rules. (Prior to the 9/11 attacks, the facility had no armed guards on-site, relying on response from off-site campus police of-ficers in the event of a problem.)

Other law enforcement activities, such as preventing recruiting and curtailing financial activities, may also be effective:

Terrorist efforts to recruit people with relevant expertise—such as nuclear physicists, metallurgists, or uranium machinists—may be one of the more detectable activities associated with a nuclear weapons effort. To increase awareness of this potential problem (and increase the chance that such recruitment attempts would be reported), police and intelligence agencies should seek to build relationships at locations that may pose particular opportunities for such recruiting efforts.

[I]t is worth making a major effort to change the conditions that make it easier for extreme Islamist terrorist groups to recruit and raise funds—to reduce the dangers of all forms of terrorism, not just nuclear terrorism.

Given the global nature of the threat, as well as the technical expertise required for dealing with nuclear materials, local officials may have relatively limited options to deal with the threat of nuclear terrorism; but that's not the same thing as having no options.

Other Views on the NYPD Report

In a follow-up to last week's post about the NYPD report on jihadist radicalization, today I did a quick review of what others are saying about the report. I've tried to avoid the shallow analyses and partisan sniping that the report has generated and focus on some substantive comments from various corners:

TPM Muckraker argues that the radicalization process described by the NYPD is too generic to be of much practical value:

[T]he process is itself a generic description of the process of joining any identity-oriented group. al-Qaeda adherents or al-Qaeda-inspired radicals are a maddeningly diverse bunch, extending in background from former high-tech engineers to Mary Kay cosmetics representatives to former metalheads. They can be second-generation U.S. or European Muslims, or converts.

As a result, describing patterns of "pre-jihadist" behavior inclines towards the generic, making it difficult to know what to do with the information.

Point acknowledged. There are two ways to deal with this, as I see it:

1. To locate potential emerging jihadist radicals, make sure you've got trustworthy contacts within the local Muslim community. (More on this below.) Unlike other major battles that law enforcement must fight (e.g., against organized crime, drug gangs, etc.) the fight against jihadist radicalization includes an element that can potentially serve as a major advantage: The presence of trustworthy people who may be in close proximity to potential jihadist radicals. It's worth remembering that as radicalization proceeds, jihadists tend to leave the mosque. They want to separate themselves from our potential allies within the Muslim community, who can help guard against emerging radicalism. The challenge for homeland security is developing a trusting relationship, often across religious and ethnic boundaries. It can be done, however.

2. Watch for precursor crimes that emerging terrorists tend to commit. The commission of these crimes differentiates potential terrorists from other identity-oriented groups.

Columnist Peggy Noonan argues that we make it easy for potential terrorists to see us as "bad":

The only thing I'd add is that all modern young people come from two environments. The first is the immediate family, which is human and therefore by definition imperfect, sometimes to a serious and destructive degree. The other is the broader culture in which we all live, and which includes everything from schools to the neighborhood to the media. It's not a new thing to say but it's still true that the latter, which is more powerful than ever, is wholly devoted to the material. People are money winners or luxury item enjoyers. They just want stuff. It is soulless.

The view we show of life to ourselves, and to whatever lost young men are watching, is not broad and inspiriting. It is limited and dispiriting. It is every man for himself.

We make it too easy for those who want to hate us to hate us. We make ourselves look bad in our media, which helps future jihadists think that they must, by hating us, be good.

Even if Noonan is right that the root of the problem is a "soulless" culture, this is such a broad take on the problem that it's hard to know what to do with it. Such a broad, sweeping problem would require a broad, sweeping solution.

On the local level, I suppose it's possible to do everything we can as individuals to show that American culture is not soulless. Most people already do that every day. I suppose it's always good to remind ourselves to be good, though.

Senator Joseph Lieberman (I - CT) issued a statement which mostly consisted of bland platitudes. But I though this particular bland platitude was worth repeating:

The report underscores the critical role of local law enforcement in proactive efforts to find the terrorists before they strike.

I'd be doing a disservice if I didn't consider the reaction from major American Muslim organizations; after all, this is a report about the potential growth of jihadism in the U.S. The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) said the report would cast suspicion on all Muslims:

[A] new NYPD report on "radicalization" may result in all U.S. Muslims being viewed with suspicion.

"Whatever one thinks of the analysis contained in the report, its sweeping generalizations and mixing of unrelated elements may serve to cast a pall of suspicion over the entire American Muslim community."

The Muslim Public Affairs council added:

The report and comments made by NYPD officials use overly broad language to describe average Muslim American young people who they say could pose a threat. ... This generalization could potentially lead to further isolation of youth who will feel like they are being singled out due to their racial or religious background.

Meanwhile, the American Islamic Forum for Democracy (AIFD) commended the report and criticized the reaction of CAIR and MPAC, arguing that:

Understanding the ideological footprints which create a radicalized Islamist is vitally necessary in detecting and preventing future tragedies from occurring. Vigilance and caution is far different from blanket suspicion.

My take: If everyone acts incredibly dumb about this, then CAIR and MPAC could be right. If law enforcement agencies do in fact read the report as MPAC reads it (i.e., as a direction to "be on the lookout for Arab males between the ages of 18-35") then they'll cast a net that's far too broad and in the end they'll end up alienating the very people who could be helpful allies in this ideological struggle.

If, however, everyone is smart about it, then no such scenario needs to occur. Jihadist-inspired terrorism is a fact, and the U.S. is vulnerable to it (New York in particular). It is perfectly reasonable for the NYPD to examine this phenomenon and its roots - in fact it would be a dereliction of duty for the NYPD not to examine it. Furthermore the NYPD is right to point out that you can't predict where a jihadist will come from. The profile of jihadists is incredibly diverse. The stories of John Walker Lindh and Adam Gadahn are more than enough evidence of that.

I'll go out on a fairly sturdy limb and say that the average U.S. police officer does not have a deep, highly sophisticated understanding of Islamic theology and/or a very intimate familiarity with the Muslim community in their jurisdiction. To avoid counterproductive, "broad brush" anti-terrorism efforts, they need better information. They need to understand the subtleties that may indicate cells of jihadism within the Muslim community. The best way to gain this understanding is through sharing information with the Muslim community itself.

If both law enforcement and American Muslims are smart, they'll collaborate in the interest of a common goal: preventing radicalization and jihadism in the U.S. If neither makes the attempt, then an important opportunity will be missed.

NYPD Report on Homegrown Terrorism

The NYPD Intelligence Division has released a major new report on homegrown terrorism, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat. Specifically, the report focuses on the process by which seemingly ordinary citizens become radicalized as jihadists.

The report has been briefly covered elsewhere. Here, I'll try to dig a bit deeper and connect it to some other sources on the radicalization and recruitment processes.

A few initial thoughts:

1. The NYPD study spends virtually all of its energy examining the activities of terrorists during the radicalization process - the phases during which radicals are recruited, become committed to the cause, and eventually go operational. As I've emphasized before, I think that the recruiting and radicalization process are absolutely the place to undertake counterterrorist activities. The earlier phases present the best opportunities for detecting existing radicals and for preventing the radicalization of potential recruits. The report itself says:

Where once we would have defined the initial indicator of the threat at the point where a terrorist or group of terrorists would actually plan an attack, we have now shifted our focus to a much earlier point—a point where we believe the potential terrorist or group of terrorists begin and progress through a process of radicalization.

2. From a theoretical perspective, the study does not really provide much new insight into the radicalization process. The four-step process described in the NYPD study (Pre-Radicalization, Self-Identification, Indoctrination, Jihadization) has been described elsewhere, albeit in different terms. For example, see the State Department's recent e-journal Countering the Terrorist Mentality, this chapter of the McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook, or the excellent book Unconquerable Nation by Brian Michael Jenkins, who also participated in the creation of the NYPD report.) However, the NYPD study still has great value in that it describes how this process has played out in the real world, in 11 different cases of jihadism, both inside the US and in other Western countries.

In other words, the study bridges the gap between theory and practice. As such, it provides a useful blueprint for law enforcement and other agencies (such as the FDNY) who seek to prevent future terrorist activities.

3. The title of the NYPD report, "Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat" strikes me a a misnomer, since the report focuses exclusively on jihadist radicalism. Generally speaking, the process of radicalization, as well as the attendant threat of terrorism, applies to other ideologies as well (e.g., the anti-government ideology of Timothy McVeigh).

So ... on to the review.

The guts of the NYPD report is as follows. If you read nothing else of this bloated post, read this:

An assessment of the various reported models of radicalization leads to the conclusion
that the radicalization process is composed of four distinct phases:

• Stage 1: Pre-Radicalization • Stage 2: Self-Identification • Stage 3: Indoctrination • Stage 4: Jihadization

o Each of these phases is unique and has specific signatures
o All individuals who begin this process do not necessarily pass through all the stages
o Many stop or abandon this process at different points
o Although this model is sequential, individuals do not always follow a perfectly linear progression
o Individuals who do pass through this entire process are quite likely to be involved in the planning or implementation of a terrorist act

Significantly, NYPD makes an important note which I've argued before: There are "markers" to the radicalization process, and these present a significant vulnerability for potential terrorists:

The four stages of the radicalization process, each with its distinct set of indicators and signatures, are clearly evident in each of the nearly one dozen terrorist-related case studies reviewed in this report.

o In spite of the differences in both circumstances and environment in each of the cases, there is a remarkable consistency in the behaviors and trajectory of each of the plots across all the stages.
o This consistency provides a tool for predictability.

I'll take a closer look at the four stages suggested by the NYPD and then offer some insights into where we might go from here.

Pre-Radicalization

The NYPD points out that, for the most part, jihadists are self-selected. They move voluntarily into the radicalization process. (A point that was also made by Brian Michael Jenkins in his April testimony before Congress.) There are no specific triggers that spur the start of the radicalization process:

[T]he transformation of a Western-based individual to a terrorist is not triggered by oppression, suffering, revenge, or desperation. Rather, it is a phenomenon that occurs because the individual is looking for an identity and a cause and unfortunately, often finds them in the extremist Islam.

There is no useful profile to assist law enforcement or intelligence to predict who will follow this trajectory of radicalization. Rather, the individuals who take this course begin as “unremarkable” from various walks of life.

It's been argued before that there is "no profile" for a jihadist, but I prefer the NYPD language - that there's "no useful profile." It's possible to create a profile, using the broad outlines that NYPD and others have suggested. Jihadist recruits do tend to be young males who are searching for something that will give their life meaning. But since that describes almost every male in the world between the ages of - say - 15 and 25, it's not particularly useful as a predictive model.

This [Salafist] ideology is proliferating in Western democracies at a logarithmic rate. The Internet, certain Salafi-based NGO’s (non-governmental organizations), extremist sermons /study groups, Salafi literature, jihadi videotapes, extremist - sponsored trips to radical madrassas and militant training camps abroad have served as “extremist incubators” for young, susceptible Muslims -- especially ones living in diaspora communities in the West.

The Internet is a driver and enabler for the process of radicalization.

The radicalization process is accelerating in terms of how long it takes and the individuals are continuing to get younger. [JB: Trends that have also been noted in Britain.] Moreover, with the higher risks associated with heading down this pathway, individuals will seek to conceal their actions earlier, making intelligence and law enforcement’s job even more difficult.

Individuals generally appear to begin the radicalization process on their own. Invariably, as they progress through the stages of radicalization they seek like-minded individuals. This leads to the creation of groups or clusters. These clusters appear almost essential to progressing to the Jihadization stage—the critical stage that leads to a terrorist act.

The last paragraph above is vital: Radicalization is a social process. Groups of like-minded people are almost always involved.

There are very few Ted Kacynski's out there - loners who are drawn into radical beliefs and progress on their own through the process of becoming operational terrorists.

This is a vulnerability for terrorists. They must cluster together. They must have safe spaces. They must, at some point, share their radical beliefs with one another. As they go operational, they must maintain security.

There is not only an actual vulnerability in all of these social activities; there is also a strong perception of vulnerability. Terrorists have to look over their shoulders. Even the perception of a threat can be a strong de-motivating factor to them, as the anxieties of the Fort Dix plotters suggest.

And even top al Qaeda strategists recognize the vulnerability of operations if the participants are not fully indoctrinated into the ideology.

As a social process, radicalization relies on leaders:

Although there are many groups or clusters of individuals that are on the path of radicalization, each group needs certain archetypes to evolve from just being a “bunch of guys” to an operational terrorist cell. All eleven case studies had a “spiritual sanctioner” who provides the justification for jihad—a justification that is especially essential for the suicide terrorist [as well as] an “operational leader” who is essential as the group decides to conduct a terrorist act--organizing, controlling and keeping the group focused and its motivation high.

The sanctioner is responsible for developing the “Us-versus-Them/War on Islam” worldview among the group that provides the moral justification for jihad. The sanctioner is often a “self-taught” Islamic scholar and will spend countless hours providing a “cut-and-paste” version of Islam which radicalizes his followers. In many cases, the sanctioner is not involved in any operational planning but is vital in creating the jihadi mindset. The role of this “spiritual sanctioner” cannot be underestimated because “if an individual respects an Islamic scholar and that scholar tells him that fighting in the jihad is a religious duty and the only way to please God, the advice can have an enormous effect on choices.”

The "self-taught" nature of the sanctioner is a vulnerability. Islam does not typically encourage freelancing where theology is concerned, which can help to undermine the perceived religious justification for jihadism. Of course, to adopt this strategy will imply the development of a relationship with local, respected Muslim imams.

Without a solid foundation in ideology, the terrorist project can crumble:

Ideology is the bedrock and catalyst for radicalization. It defines the conflict, guides movements, identifies the issues, drives recruitment, and is the basis for action.

See also the recent testimony by Frank Cilluffo, director of the Homeland Security Policy Institute at George Washington U, who argued that "extremists have woven an effective tale of an imaginary “clash of civilizations.” The extremists’ compelling “call to action” based partly on myths and falsehoods begs for the development of an effective counter-narrative that forcefully refutes and responds to the extremists’ own.

Of course, along with ideological grounding there are more practical concerns. Since radicalization is a social process, jihadists need physical spaces in which to operate:

Critically important to the process of radicalization are the different venues that provide the extremist fodder or fuel for radicalizing—venues, to which we refer to as “radicalization incubators.”

Generally these locations, which together comprise the radical subculture of a community, are rife with extremist rhetoric. Though the locations can be mosques, more likely incubators include cafes, cab driver hangouts, flophouses, prisons, student associations, nongovernmental organizations, hookah (water pipe) bars, butcher shops and book stores. While it is difficult to predict who will radicalize, these nodes are likely places where like-minded individuals will congregate as they move through the radicalization process. The Internet, with its thousands of extremist websites and chat-rooms, is a virtual incubator of its own. In fact, many of the extremists began their radical conversion while researching or just surfing in the cyber world.

The existence of these "incubators" can facilitate the transition from peaceful, pre-radicalized citizen to self-identified jihadist.

Self-Identification Phase

As indicated before, potential jihadists are typically seeking a cause - something to give meaning to their lives. If they find a cause and meaning in a radical group, they are susceptible to radicalization themselves:

Individuals most vulnerable to experiencing this phase are often those who are at a crossroad in life—those who are trying to establish an identity, or a direction, while seeking approval and validation for the path taken.

Ultimately the individual is alienated from his former life and affiliates with like-minded individuals, who, via small group dynamics, strengthen his dedication to Salafi Islam. Importantly, this phase is characterized by a self-selection process by which individuals first join a group that then becomes radicalized.

These crises often compel these individuals to seek out other like-minded individuals, who may be experiencing the same inner conflict. Subsequently, clusters of like-minded individuals begin to form, usually around social circles that germinate within the extremist incubators.

It should be noted that this process of self-identification is not unique to the jihadist enterprise. Young people want to join something that gives structure and meaning to their lives.

In a healthy environment, young people will have a wide range of positive choices to do so. These may be affiliated with churches, schools, civic organizations, the military, a trade or technical profession - just about anything.

But the negative side, young people may find meaning and support within gangs, criminal organizations, or even terrorist organizations. This suggests that it is vital to ensure that young people are exposed to a wide range of positive choices.

Indoctrination

As suggested by the al Qaeda doctrine referred to above, it is essential for jihadists to entirely accept the ideology. This occurs during the Indoctrination stage.

Indoctrination is the stage in which an individual progressively intensifies his beliefs, wholly adopts jihadi-Salafi ideology and concludes, without question, that the conditions and circumstances exist where action is required to support and further the Salafist cause.

The key aspect of this stage is the acceptance of a religious-political worldview that justifies, legitimizes, encourages, or supports violence against anything kufr, or un-Islamic, including the West, its citizens, its allies, or other Muslims whose opinions are contrary to the extremist agenda. In effect, as the individuals become indoctrinated, they re-define their direction in life.

NYPD suggests that, for jihadists, one of the key indicators of this stage is ironically:

Withdrawal from the Mosque. As individuals begin to conceive militant jihad as an objective, they retreat from the mosque—the mosque that not only served as an extremist incubator for their formative years in becoming radicalized but also and often as the place where these individuals met their like-minded cohorts. This withdrawal is sometimes provoked by the fact that the mosque no longer serves the individual’s radicalization needs. In other words, the individual’s level of extremism surpasses that of the mosque.

This suggests that a trusting relationship with the local imam may be helpful in identifying potential radicals.

Jihadization

During the final phase, Jihadization:

[M]embers of the cluster accept their individual duty to participate in jihad and self-designate themselves as holy warriors or mujahedeen.

The group is more important, but also harder to bust.

By the jihadization phase, small group dynamics play a much more prominent role. While during the earlier stages, the group members may have been only acquaintances, meeting each other in Salafi chat rooms, at university or simply by being friends, by the jihadization phase the group has solidified and hardened. Individuals see themselves as part a movement and group loyalty becomes paramount above all other relationships.

Once indoctrination is complete, the Jihadization stage may occur quickly. And for one or more members of the group, overseas travel may be a trigger:

It is critical to note that while the other stages of radicalization may take place, gradually, over two to three years, the jihadization stage—the stage which defines the actual attack--can occur quickly, and with very little warning. In some cases, this stage runs its course in as little as a couple of weeks. The jihadization stage contains many substages, all of which usually occur, but not necessarily sequentially. Each of these substages is characterized by a unique set of indicator(s).

• Accepting Jihad/Decision to Commit Jihad. As each group member accepts jihad, they often look abroad--seeking that one trigger that will lead to their final acceptance of jihad or for others an opportunity to actually conduct jihad.

Frequently, but not always, one or more members of a particular Western-based cluster travels abroad. This travel often follows or contributes to a member’s decision to commit jihad. The travel is more often than not to a militant training camp—a camp usually in a country or region that is regarded as a field of jihad.

There are also more mundane matters in going operational. All of these present opportunities for detection and intervention:

Prior to launching the attack, many of these clusters have participated in some form of group training and preparation to include:

“Outward Bound”-like Activities. Activities such as camping, white-water rafting, paintball games, target shooting, and even outdoor simulations of military-like maneuvers have been popular among these groups once they reach this stage of radicalization.

Attack Planning. Once a cluster or group decides to conduct an attack, they begin conducting research while holding secretive tactical group discussions on targets, the mode of attack, the operational scenario (date, time, and hour), and the role of each group member. This sub-stage includes several indicators such as:

o Reconnaissance/Surveillance. Drawing maps, videotaping targets, and staking out target areas will invariably be conducted in the run-up to any attack.

o Acquiring Materiel/Developing the Device. The majority of the devices used or that were being planned to be used in the homegrown plots were either commercially available or reasonably obtainable. Fertilizer-based devices, commercial explosives, cell phones and explosive ignition devices have all been acquired with relative ease.

That said, the acquisition of the materiel and the development of the weapon has on occasion been associated with low-end criminal activity and almost always suspicious activity such as: cooking chemicals to form explosives in bathtubs, purchasing large amounts of any one chemical or material, outfitting/modifying backpacks, buying TNT and wiring watches as detonators.

If the signs of radicalization are not discovered by this time, it's essentially too late:

The ultimate stage of jihadization is, of course, the actual attack. By this time, all the potential preemptive indicators have expired. The terrorists have attained both intention and capability and the chances for law enforcement and intelligence thwarting or preventing an attack is extremely low.

This is the same point I made in this post regarding the London and Glasgow bombings.

Strategies for Addressing the Radicalization Process

What to do about the radicalization process, then? The challenges are clear:

Identifying whether an individual is being radicalized is hard to detect, especially in the early stages.

• The individuals are not on the law enforcement radar. Most have never been arrested or involved in any kind of legal trouble. Other than some commonalities in age and religion, individuals undergoing radicalization appear as “ordinary” citizens, who look, act, talk, and walk like everyone around them. In fact, in the United Kingdom, it is precisely those “ordinary” middle class university students who are sought after by local extremists because they are “clean skins”.

• In the early stages of their radicalization, these individuals rarely travel, are not participating in any kind of militant activity, yet they are slowly building the mindset, intention, and commitment to conduct jihad.

As evidenced by all eleven case studies these groups, or clusters of extremists:

• Act autonomously, can radicalize quickly, and often are made up of individuals, who on the surface, appear to be well-integrated into society.

• Are not “name brand” terrorists or part of any known terrorist group. For the most part, they have little or no links to known militant groups or actors. Rather they are like-minded individuals who spend time together in clusters organized, originally, by previously established social network links.

• Are not crime syndicates and therefore, applying organized crime strategies will fail.

The NYPD report does not delve deeply into potential solutions, but instead provides a template for understanding how solutions may be developed.

In his introduction to the NYPD report, RAND's Brian Michael Jenkins also contextualizes the challenge for law enforcement:

[E]fforts should be made to enhance the intelligence capabilities of local police, who through community policing, routine criminal investigations, or dedicated intelligence operations may be best positioned to uncover future terrorist plots. Of these, continued intelligence operations are the most important. Radicalization makes little noise. It borders on areas protected by the First and Fourth Amendments. It takes place over a long period of time. It therefore does not lend itself to a traditional criminal investigations approach.

NYPD notes that signs of radicalization are often subtle:

The subtle and non-criminal nature of the behaviors involved in the process of radicalization makes it difficult to identify or even monitor from a law enforcement standpoint. Taken in isolation, individual behaviors can be seen as innocuous; however, when seen as part of the continuum of the radicalization process, their significance becomes more important. Considering the sequencing of these behaviors and the need to identify those entering this process at the earliest possible stage makes intelligence the critical tool in helping to thwart an attack or even prevent the planning of future plots.

In the US cases examined by NYPD, it was not always even readily apparent that radicalization had occurred:

The three U.S.-based cases provided fewer examples of signature activities during the stages and sub-stages of the radicalization process than the five foreign examples. The lack of rich details on these U.S. cases, coupled with the fact that they were disrupted at a relatively early stage, obscured the fact that radicalization had occurred.

Although NYPD does not provide a blueprint for intervention, others have suggested potential approaches to countering the radicalization process. I think there's a nice dovetail between the radicalization process identified by NYPD and the solution set offered by the State Department in Countering the Terrorist Mentality:

To make such active measures effective, the three strategic components of the terrorist threat that must be neutralized are leaders, safe havens, and underlying conditions.

Addressing underlying conditions will affect the Pre-Radicalization stage. Disrupting the perceived security of safe havens will frustrate the Self-Identification and Indoctrination stages. Identifying and neutralizing leaders will deter action during the Indoctrination and Jihadization stages.

Another preventive approach is the "Capone Strategy" I've discussed before, which exploits the common vulnerability of terrorists: the commission of "precursor crimes." (See this CRS report for more on precursor crimes.)

From a broader perspective, it is important to recognize that "top-down" approaches are likely to be ineffective. Per the previously cited testimony by Frank Cilluffo:

[T]he solution sets for the problem under discussion must emanate principally from the grassroots, from local communities, their leaders and the citizens that reside there. ... law enforcement at the local level should develop new relationships and deepen existing ones within Muslim communities as local figures are best placed to identify radicalization at its earliest stages.

There is, of course, a delicate balance to be maintained here, as Jenkins alluded to when he discussed First and Fourth Amendment concerns. The United States cannot become a police state. The nation was founded on the then-radical principle that if people are given liberty, they can be generally counted upon to do the right thing. In short, we are a nation built on trust. We cannot jeopardize that principle. As Frank Cilluffo and 9/11 Commission co-chair Lee Hamilton argued on behalf of the Future of Terrorism Task Force:

Trust is the most valuable currency we have in this battle because trust underpins all counterterrorism tools (e.g., military, diplomatic/policy, legal, economic and covert action).

All things considered, the NYPD report is an excellent addition to the literature that can help local homeland security professionals develop a strategy to prepare for and prevent terrorism.

Cross-posted in IPS Blogs at the Institute for Preventive Strategies.

U.S. Jihadists: Passport Required?

The following snippet from Chris Heffelfinger's recent piece in Terrorism Monitor, "Behind the Indoctrination and Training of American Jihadis," caught my eye:

After conducting numerous case studies at the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, research has demonstrated a pattern for radicalization among Americans who embrace jihad, whether foreign or U.S. born. The cases of the Lackawanna Six, the Portland Seven, the Virginia Jihad Group, as well as John Walker Lindh, Adam Gadahn and others demonstrate the need to travel overseas to receive training. In all of the above cases, the individuals traveled, or attempted to travel, to Pakistan or Afghanistan.

Yes ... but past performance does not necessarily indicate future results.

Heffelfinger seems to be arguing that traveling and training overseas are necessary preconditions for jihadist radicalization among Americans.

While I acknowledge that the U.S. terrorism suspects who have lacked overseas training have been more aspirational than operational, it seems premature to conclude that in the absence of overseas training, radicalization and/or technical proficiency in terrorist tactics is not possible.

We are a nation awash in potential targets and the materials necessary to carry out a terrorist act. And while there is a strong social element to terrorist indoctrination, it certainly seems to be possible that a group of like-minded individuals could spur one another down the path to jihadism.

The London-Glasgow Bombers: Homegrown?

Some characteristics of the June London-Glasgow bombers make them unusual, Jeffrey Cozzens reports in Terrorism Monitor:

First, there were no converts among the group, perhaps indicating a more global element to this plot:

Unlike many previous jihadi plots and attacks in the United Kingdom (including the "Operation Crevice" cell, the 7/7 attackers and the autumn 2006 "planes" plot), there is no data thus far to indicate the involvement of Muslim converts. Converts to radical Islam have figured prominently in European-based jihadism (arguably because of their accelerated embrace of Salafi-Jihadi activism in their quest for "authentic Islam"), and the absence of such in this plot could indicate a more international cast of organizers.

(For more on the vulnerability of converts to the radicalization process, see these previous posts.)

Along with the fact that the plotters were from atypical countries (most notably India), this plot takes on a particular "international" flavor:

While still too early to draw firm conclusions about the plot and its alleged participants, there is one strategic angle elicited by these events that merits consideration: the tension between the global and homegrown nature of the plot, a point of recent media speculation and contradicting views among the quoted "intelligence sources" (Daily Mail, July 4). The history of jihad in the United Kingdom demonstrates that, with few exceptions, this is a faulty dichotomy. Both global and homegrown forces motivated and shaped most, if not all, jihadi plots in the United Kingdom and the West. This theory will likely be validated in the case of the June 2007 plots as well.

Cozzens argues that it may be time to do away with the concept of "homegrown terrorism" - as jihadist terrorism is a global phenomenon, and jihadist terror groups share little other than ideology:

The nature of global jihadi ideology itself, however, with its focus on pan-Islamic suffering and unity, defense of Muslim lands and the establishment of Sharia zones in the place of current Middle Eastern, African and Asian regimes, inherently exhibits transnational qualities and aspirations—even if those who subscribe to it never travel outside London or Los Angeles to meet with al-Qaeda operatives or receive overt directions from international terrorist networks. Homegrown jihadi plots, in this respect, are misnomers.

In sum, separating the homegrown from the global nature of this plot will likely prove exceedingly difficult, as will determining whether the bottom-up impetus of the suspects' British experiences—or conversely, their association with al-Qaeda-linked figures—motivated their suspected activities. This calls for a new mode of thinking about Western jihadi networks and a re-exploration of the strategic doctrine behind this militant organizational form—one in which the structural links to al-Qaeda are ambiguous, but ideologically connectivity a certainty.

Most terrorism has historically been a reaction to local events - commonly, resistance to oppression or occupation. The idea that upwardly mobile professionals in Britain, with a bright future to look forward to, would commit terrorism in response to grievances on behalf of others around the world is a challenge to the process of preventing radicalization.

On the local level, it suggests to me that intelligence is critical. Radicalization must proceed along social tracks, which can be identified and guarded. And once radicalized, jihadists (especially those in self-contained cells whose primary connectivity to others is ideological) must learn the tradecraft of violence - presenting another opportunity for intervention. Fortunately, the Internet has so far been an inefficient tool for learning the terror trade, so some real-world training is useful and/or necessary (see this earlier post).

It is these points along the path of radicalization and "going operational" that present opportunities for local homeland security.

Former MI5 Head: Jihadist Radicalization Process Speeds Up

In The Daily Telegraph, the former head of Britain's internal intelligence agency, the MI5, says that the radicalization process of jihadists in the UK is speeding up.

Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, the former director-general of MI5, said the radicalisation of teenage Muslims "from first exposure, to extremism, to active participation in terrorist plotting" was now worryingly rapid.

It was vital that the Government rose to the challenge of trying to change the attitudes that "lead some of our young people to become terrorists".

How to do this? Manningham-Buller advises:

She warned of the "pressing demand" for the police to create a secret network of Muslim spies capable of improving intelligence gathering.

[S]he called on both the police and MI5 to develop their relationship, which she said had created a counter-terrorist organisation "unmatched anywhere in the world".

In creating a network of Muslim spies, is the goal to infiltrate and disrupt potential jihadist groups, or is it to identify and address the root causes of the quickening pace of jihadism? The former is a necessary-but-insufficient short-term solution. The latter is ultimately the key to addressing the threat.

And yet...

The former spy chief also warned that "it is inevitable that some terrorist plots will escape our combined attention," adding: "Even if we have the numbers of personnel engaged in looking at our own citizens as, say, the KGB or the Stasi did during the Cold War, and with the same authoritarian powers, some things would slip under the radar."

Manningham-Buller's warning regarding the inevitability of terrorist attacks is well-founded and appropriate. The idea that the U.S. can eliminate the risk of further terrorist attacks - or even that we already have eliminated it - is a false notion. We run the risk of being lulled into a false sense of security.

Such misperceptions are ultimately dangerous, as they disrupt our ability to respond in a manner consistent with the threat.

Update 2007-07-09: A tip of the cap to Jonah Czerwinski at Homeland Security Watch, who also addresses the radicalization process. Jonah links to a pair of related documents which I'll briefly cover here. First is the recent congressional testimony of Frank Cilluffo, who directs the Homeland Security Policy Institute and George Washington U.

Cilluffo contextualizes the problem:

Radicalization is not a well understood phenomenon, hence greater study of the life cycle of a terrorist – specifically, the process by which an individual becomes motivated to listen to radical ideas, read about them, self-enlist or respond to terrorist recruiting efforts, and ultimately, undertake terrorist activity – is needed in part to identify trigger points and possible points of intervention.

There is agreement that there is no single terrorist profile; however, there are some more general indicators that may indicate whether a young person is susceptible to the siren song of jihadism, such as a desire to join a group, to do something meaningful, to strike back against perceived forces of oppression, etc. (See this post.)

Cilluffo addresses the differences between "homegrown terrorism" in Europe and the U.S.:

[I]t is something of a misnomer to speak of “homegrown terrorism” for the term is suggestive of watertight compartments that do not in fact exist. To the contrary, we live in a borderless world and the threats that we face are similarly transnational. That said, the United States remains in some respects reasonably well situated. Other countries are currently experiencing a more full-blown manifestation of certain dimensions of the problem such as the United Kingdom. In a sense therefore, we have an opportunity to get ahead of the curve and deal proactively with these elements before they have the chance to flourish more vigorously in this country.

It is true that real differences exist between the U.S. and Europe, in terms of the risk of jihadism (See this post as well as this analysis of European jihadism from Foreign Affairs.) But Cilluffo is correct in his assertion that we are becoming borderless.

Internet chat rooms are now supplementing and replacing mosques, community centers and coffee shops as venues for recruitment and radicalization by terrorist groups like al Qaeda. The real time, two-way dialogue of chat rooms has enabled extremist ideas to be shared, take root, be reaffirmed and spread exponentially. By incorporating and manipulating local political grievances – some of which are legitimate – extremists have woven an effective tale of an imaginary “clash of civilizations.” The extremists’ compelling “call to action” based partly on myths and falsehoods begs for the development of an effective counter-narrative that forcefully refutes and responds to the extremists’ own.

[I]t is clear that the U.S. needs to catch up in this cyber-battle of words and ideas. However, unless elements of the counter-narrative emanate from within the Muslim community and are conveyed by voices that are trusted and credible within those communities, the opportunity to achieve impact will be limited at best.

So far it seems that online recruits have not been able to develop robust operational capabilities. The intent is there, but the skills are lacking.

The larger point here is the creation of the counter-narrative. I couldn't agree more.

Cilluffo extends his argument, echoing my sentiments above - that infiltration and disruption are only short-term fixes to the radicalization problem, and that a real solution must address the root causes:

Granted, where appropriate we should seek to deny or disrupt extremist access to and extremist efforts through the Internet via legal and technical means and covert action. At the same time however, it is crucial that we bear in mind wider and deeper goals and themes such as the need to offer an alternative to those who feel alienated and marginalized. Another example is the importance of intelligence work to inform counterterrorism. These underlying or foundational elements merit special consideration as they are critical components of our efforts concerning radicalization writ large.

Importantly for local first preventers, Cilluffo emphasizes the importance of local action to solve the radicalization problem:

[T]he solution sets for the problem under discussion must emanate principally from the grassroots, from local communities, their leaders and the citizens that reside there. Governments at the federal, state, local and tribal levels certainly have a contribution to make however, and there is also a measure of interplay between the public and private sectors that is and will continue to be crucial to combating radicalization at home and elsewhere.

For instance, law enforcement at the local level should develop new relationships and deepen existing ones within Muslim communities as local figures are best placed to identify radicalization at its earliest stages. Cultivated mutual respect and understanding between officials and communities, founded on a solid education about Muslim cultures and Islam, is critical. Notably, in the Fort Dix case, the mosque attended by three of the plotters quickly called an “emergency town hall meeting” to invite law enforcement, other officials, and members of the public “to ask anything they want about the mosque or about Islam, and to publicize a ringing denunciation of terrorism and violence of any sort…”.

Also see this post regarding the relationship between local law enforcement and Muslim communities.

Next, Jonah links to this report from the Future of Terrorism Task Force. Published in January and attributed to 9/11 Commission co-chair Lee Hamilton and the aforementioned Frank Cilluffo, it comes to a similar conclusion as Manningham-Buller:

Like crime or disease, terrorism should be conceived as a chronic problem requiring a sustained and patient strategy, with ever evolving tactics.

Hamilton and Cilluffo also find that radicalization is spreading:

While difficult to measure with precision, it is known that al Qaeda’s ideology is spreading. Per the National Intelligence Estimate, “Although we cannot measure the extent of the spread with precision, a large body of all-source reporting indicates that activists identifying themselves as jihadists, although a small percentage of Muslims, are increasing in both number and geographic dispersion.”

One problem that limits the West's ability to prevent the spread of jihadism is limited knowledge of Islam. As a result, we have a difficult time driving a wedge between the violent jihadists and the broad Muslim community:

Muslim culture, and in particular the Islamic faith, are not widely understood within the Western world. This lack of understanding, coupled with fear of extremist adversaries, taints our ability to relate with the larger and overwhelmingly peaceful and moderate Muslim population, reinforcing misconceptions of and dividing us from those susceptible to radicalization.

But the effort to drive this wedge is best placed at the local level:

The potential rise of self radicalized, unaffiliated terrorists domestically cannot be easily prevented through traditional federal intelligence efforts, and requires the incorporation of state and local solutions. Similarly, the protection of critical assets, as well as the initial response to an attack, are primarily state, local and private sector responsibilities, with federal assets and resources provided as a supplement.

As we carry out our counterterrorism efforts, we can learn important lessons from other nations:

Australian officials, for example, have concluded that protective security measures over the next five years must not become rigid, and both variability and unpredictability must be consciously injected into flexible prevention measures.

Israeli officials highlighted the need for public participation, rather than just awareness, and emphasized that resilience must be built from the bottom up in addition to the top down.

In Britain, officials have worked to inculcate in the public an understanding that there is no such thing as zero risk, and that sometimes even the best efforts of the authorities will not be good enough.

As I see it, the underlying philosophical stance of Hamilton and Cilluffo's argument is best expressed by this passage:

To change hearts and minds – and encourage moderation – we must challenge ideas with ideas. Trust is the most valuable currency we have in this battle because trust underpins all counterterrorism tools (e.g., military, diplomatic/policy, legal, economic and covert action).